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This paper provides  a comprehensive overview  of the European takeover market. We characterize the main features of the 
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amounts to 21% for the targets and 0.9% for the bidders. We show that the estimated shareholder wealth effect strongly depends 
on the different attributes of the takeovers. The type of takeover bid has a large impact on the short-term wealth effects for the 
target firm shareholders with hostile takeovers triggering substantially larger price reactions than friendly transactions. When a 
UK target is involved, the abnormal returns are higher than those of bids involving a Continental European target. There is strong 
evidence that the means of payment has a large impact on the share prices of both bidder and target. 
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1. Introduction. 
 
It is now a well-known fact that mergers and acquisitions (M&As) come in waves. Golbe and White 
(1993) were among the first to observe empirically the cyclical pattern of M&A activity. Thus far, five 
waves have been examined in the literature: those of the early 1900s, the 1920s, the 1960s, the 1980s, and 
the 1990s. Of these, the most recent wave was particularly remarkable in terms of size and geographical 
dispersion. For the first time, Continental European firms were as eager to participate as their US and UK 
counterparts, and M&A activity in Europe hit levels similar to those experienced in the US. It is widely 
believed  that  the  introduction  of  the  Euro,  the  globalisation  process,  technological  innovation, 
deregulation and privatisation, as well as the financial markets boom spurred European companies to take 
part in M&As during the 1990s.  
 
This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the European takeover market. We characterize the 
main features of the domestic and cross-border corporate takeovers involving European companies in the 
period 1993-2001 and contrast them to those of takeovers in the second takeover wave of 1984-1989. We 
provide detailed information on the size and dynamics of takeover activity in 28 Continental European 
countries and the UK and Ireland. In addition, we investigate the shareholder short-term wealth effects of 
a large sample of European M&As. We examine how the estimated shareholder wealth effects vary 
depending on the different types of takeovers (merger or tender offer), bid attitude (friendly or hostile), 
payment  method  (all-cash,  all-equity,  or  mixed),  legal  status  of  the  target  firm  (public  or  private), 
takeover strategy (focus or diversification) and the legal origin of bidder and target. As all these bid-
specific characteristics reflect the bidders’ motives (shareholder value-maximization objective, managers’ 
personal utility, or managerial hubris), we expect them to explain a significant part of variation in the 
shareholder wealth effects across the takeover deals.  
 
The  bulk  of  previous  research  on  M&A  activity  is  confined  to  the  US  and  UK.  We  believe  that  a 
European-wide study contributes to this literature, as it allows us to evaluate the impact of a wide range of 
institutional settings and legal and regulatory rules on the pattern of M&A activity. In comparison to the 
US and UK, Continental European companies are characterized by weaker investor protection and less 
developed capital markets (LaPorta et al. 1998), and by more concentrated ownership structure (Faccio 
and Lang 2002). The analysis presented in this chapter emphasizes the potential differences in Anglo-
American markets for corporate control and Continental European ones.  Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe 
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The rest of this chapter is outlined as follows. In Section 2, we provide a detailed overview of the 
European market for corporate control in 1984-2001. Section 3 reviews the main findings from previous 
studies  on  mergers  and  acquisitions.  Section  4  describes  the  data  sources,  sample  statistics,  and 
methodology used to compute cumulative average abnormal returns. Section 5 investigates the short-term 
wealth effects for target and bidder firms realized in intra-European M&As in the 1990s. We relate the 
announcement effect to the various characteristics of target and bidding firms and of the bid itself. Section 
6 concludes. 
 
2. The fifth takeover wave in Europe. 
 
The most recent –the fifth- wave of mergers and acquisitions was particularly remarkable compared to its 
predecessors. For the first time, Continental European firms were as eager to participate in takeovers as 
their US and UK counterparts, and M&A activity in Europe hit levels similar to those experienced in the 
US. While the main engine of takeover activity in Europe during the 1990s was still the UK, M&As in 
Continental Europe have risen substantially both in number of deals and total transaction value compared 
to the previous decades. According to the Thomson Financial Securities Data, 87,804 M&A deals were 
recorded  for  Europe  (including  the  UK)  during  1993-2001.  In  contrast,  there  were  only  9,958  such 
transactions during the fourth European merger wave (1983-89). The fifth wave in Europe is impressive 
in monetary terms as well, since its total value adds up to US$ 5.6 trillion (see Figure 1), more than eight 
times the combined total of the fourth wave.  
 
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
 
As depicted in Figures 1 and 2, there was a pattern of strong growth in the European M&A market over 
the last twenty years. From being almost negligible in the beginning of the 1980s, the takeover market 
reached a level of 4,000 annual transactions by the end of the fourth takeover wave. Furthermore, it 
started with 7,000 M&As at the beginning of the fifth wave in 1993, and more than doubled by 2000.  
 
The growing M&A activity in the late 1980s was mainly due to a significant increase in the number of 
transatlantic deals (whereby US firms were most active as acquirers). The opposite is true for the market 
for corporate control in the 1990s: the surge can be largely explained by the increase in intra-European 
transactions while the number of transatlantic M&As remained relatively stable (on average 2,500 per 
annum). Much of the change in focus towards intra-European deals can be attributed to the challenges Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe 
  3
brought about by the development of the single European market and the introduction of the Euro in the 
1990s. Fragmented and mostly domestically-oriented European companies resorted to takeover deals as a 
means to survive the tougher regional competition created by the new market. The introduction of the 
Euro has put additional pressure on firms, as it eliminated all currency risks within the Eurozone and 
reduced the home bias of investors. Cross-border acquisitions are expected to yield cost advantages and 
are to enable firms to expand their business more rapidly abroad. Moreover, takeover activity was fuelled 
by the creation of a liquid European capital market  which provides companies with new sources of 
financing (such as Euro-denominated bonds). As a result of such economic and structural changes on the 
Continent, the market for corporate control in Europe peaked at US$ 1.2 trillion in 1999, a marked 
contrast with the peak of the fourth merger wave which amounted to merely US$ 0.15 trillion.  
 
2.1. Cross-border versus domestic acquisitions. 
 
Of  the  intra-European  M&As  of  the  period  1993-2001,  one  third  were  cross-border  deals  Figure  3 
illustrates that the value of the international transactions account for nearly half of the total investment in 
M&As  by  the  end  of  1999,  up  from  22%  in  1995.  The  figures  also  reflect  the  impact  of  some 
unprecedented mega-deals such as the acquisition of Mannesmann by Vodafone in 1999 (for US$ 202 
billion).  
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
Figure 4 shows that the most active participants in the intra-European cross-border market as acquirers 
were British, German, and French firms, which paid together more than US$ 1 trillion to take over foreign 
firms. These deals represented 70% of the total amount spent on intra-European cross-border M&As over 
the period 1993-2001. Firms from the UK, Germany and France were also most frequently the targets of 
cross-border acquisitions; they were sold for a total of US$ 0.9 trillion during the 5
th takeover wave, 
amounting to about 60% of the overall value of cross-border M&As. The UK and France were the biggest 
net acquirers in cross-border takeovers, whereas Germany was a net receiver in the intra-European cross-
border market. Figure 5 sketches a similar picture based on the number of cross-border acquisitions. The 
number of cross-border deals surpassed the number of domestic ones in the Benelux countries, Austria, 
and Ireland. Another interesting observation relates to the Eastern European countries that joined the 
European  Union  in  2004.  In  these  countries,  many  firms  were  acquired  by  West-European  bidders, 
predominantly  from  neighbouring  countries  (Scandinavia,  Austria,  and  Germany).  Likewise,  Italian, Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe 
  4
Spanish, and Portuguese firms were more frequently involved in M&As as targets (of German, British 
and French bidders) than as bidders.  
 
[Insert Figures 4 and 5 about here] 
 
2.2. Industry clusters, and focus versus a diversification strategies. 
  
The  differences  in  cross-border  M&A  patterns  across  the  European  countries  partly  result  from 
restructuring needs in the major national industries. Processes like deregulation and privatization have led 
to cross-border consolidations in, amongst others, the financial sector and the utilities, by allowing former 
state-owned companies to acquire firms abroad and to have foreign investors participate in their equity 
capital. Also, the increasing R&D expenditures gave another boost to international M&As in the high-
technology industries including biochemistry and pharmaceuticals (see Figure 6). Figure 7 illustrates the 
amounts invested through cross-border acquisitions by industry. Although small in terms of the number of 
deals, the takeovers in the telecommunication sector represented a total value of US$ 470 billion over the 
period 1993-2001. This accounts for a one third of the total value of cross-border acquisitions. Another 
30% of such foreign investments went to the banking, natural resources, and utilities sectors (for a not 
insignificant  extent through  the  reorganization of  former  state-owned  firms).  Figure 8  shows  similar 
patterns for the domestic M&A markets. 
 
[Insert Figures 6, 7 and 8 about here] 
 
Table 1 discloses that many cross-border M&As made in the 1990s were between firms from the same or 
related industries. This confirms that international business expansion was one of the goals inciting firms 
to participate in European cross-border M&As in the 1990s. The smaller percentage of deals within the 
telecommunication  sector can  be  explained  by  the  fact that the telecoms mainly  engaged  in  vertical 
integration with high-tech firms. Such takeovers accounted for about 30% of the deals involving telecom 
acquirers. The fact that most of the domestic and cross-border deals (both horizontal and vertical ones) 
involved firms in related industries, consolidates the trend to focus on core business which started in the 
1980s. Figure 9 depicts that the percentage of total M&A related to divestitures increased (both in terms 
of number of deals and of takeover value) until 1993 but this effect clearly decreased over the 5
th takeover 
wave. Thus, the steady decline in the relative number of divestitures is in line with the fact that the main 
incentive for European firms in the 1990s boiled down to business expansion in order to address the 
challenges of the new European market.  Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe 
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[Insert Table 1 and Figure 9 about here] 
 
2.3. Means of payment. 
 
Corporate growth via takeovers, often taking the form of mega-deals, requires considerable financial 
resources which forces cash-constrained firms to finance the acquisitions with equity or a combination of 
equity and debt. The boom of the stock market in the second half of the 1990s increased the attractiveness 
of equity as a means of payment for acquisitions. At the same time, the European market for corporate 
bonds grew rapidly and provided another accessible source of funds. In addition, a European junk-bond 
market emerged. Low interest rates and a bank attitude more receptive to risky loans also facilitated 
M&A activity. Consequently, we observe a switch from cash toward equity and debt in the financial 
composition of the takeover bids.  
 
Figure 10 exhibits that the proportion of the total value of acquisitions paid in cash averaged about 67% in 
the 1980s, but declined to 40% over the 1990s. A similar pattern is perceived in the proportion of the 
number of pure cash deals, which fell by half in the last decade compared to the 1980s (see Figure 11). 
Whereas the proportion of common equity used in acquisitions augmented to a high 39% of the total 
value of all acquisitions (in 1998), the relative number of all-equity bids in the 1990s was still rather 
small. As depicted in Figure 11, the combination of equity, debt, and cash became the most popular 
method of payments for European M&As during 1991-2001, accounting for about 75% of all deals.  
 
[Insert Figures 10 and 11 about here] 
 
It is commonly believed that the bull market of the 1990s caused a switch from cash to equity financing in 
M&A  deals:  the  overvaluation  of  equity  provides  bidders  with  a  cheap  currency  to  pay  for  their 
acquisitions.  Figure  12  provides  some  supporting  evidence:  whereas  the  relative  number  of  all-cash 
transactions  is  inversely  related  to  the  changes  in  the  market  index,  the  trend  in  all-equity  bids  is 
positively correlated to the market. Moreover, there is a clear relation between the choice of the payment 
method and the size of a takeover (see Figure 13). Firms with insufficient cash resources to finance large 
acquisitions have increasingly resorted to a combination of equity and debt, but the very large transactions 
are fully financed with equity. Figure 13 also confirms that the average value of the M&As, especially of 
the all-equity bids, augments in line with the market index over the 1990s.  
  Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe 
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[Insert Figures 12 and 13 about here] 
 
2.4. Hostile takeovers. 
 
Paying too high a price for a target firm is more likely to occur when takeover activity is peaking because 
the bids become more aggressive and trigger more frequently opposition by the target firm. Figures 13 
and 14 show that in 1999, at the peak of the fifth European wave, the average value of deals and the 
number of hostile bids are both standing out. In that year, an unprecedented number of hostile deals with a 
total worth of US$ 501 billion (about half the total value of all M&As in 1999) occurred.  
 
Theoretically,  fewer  hostile  takeovers  are  expected  when  the  stock  market  is  climbing,  as  target 
shareholders prefer to sell their shares when they are likely to be overpriced. Figure 14 depicts that this is 
indeed the case for the UK domestic takeovers. In this country, the number of hostile bids in the past 
decade significantly fell compared to the 1980s. In contrast, the domestic bids in Continental Europe and 
the cross-border bids increased in both number and value compared to the previous wave. Moreover, 
hostile takeover activity in Europe during the 1990s emerged even in countries in which there was none 
before. Many hostile bids, which would have been opposed by the political and financial establishment in 
the  1980s,  were  welcomed  in  the  1990s.  This  last  observation  is  predominantly  valid  for  domestic 
takeovers, as in the case of cross-border bids, governments still tend to protect national champions and 
erect barriers for foreign raiders.
1  
 
2.5. Summary. 
 
To summarize the above trends characterizing the fifth takeover wave in Europe, we first note that the 
market for corporate control experienced significant growth in the 1990s partially caused by a significant 
increase in the number of intra-European acquisitions, of which one-third were cross-border transactions. 
British, German and French firms were the most active acquirers, but also the most popular targets in the 
cross-border M&A market. Central European firms were frequently targets in the international market for 
corporate control. The largest number of cross-border M&As has occurred in the industrial sector, while 
                                                 
1 It is believed that the French and Italian governments are rather successful in protecting their national champions. 
In these countries, hostile cross-border acquisitions hardly ever succeeded in the 1990s. The French and Italian 
governments encouraged (often inefficient) mergers between national firms to create large national corporations and 
hence made these firms immune against acquisitions by foreign firms. Examples are the acquisition of Telecom 
Italia by Olivetti (although it was a hostile bid, its success was largely due to do support by Italian government. that 
blocked the bid for Telecom Italia by Deutsche Telecom) or the merger between the French supermarket chains 
Carrefour and Promodes preventing their acquisition by the American chain Wal-Mart. Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe 
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in terms of total money spent on international M&As the telecommunication sector sticks out. In the 
domestic  takeover  market,  the  financial  sector  has experienced  strong  takeover  activity.  Overall, the 
number of M&As in related industries significantly surpasses the number of diversifying takeovers.  
 
The financial structure of takeover bids in the 1990s switched from a dominance of cash to a combination 
of equity, debt and cash, and – specifically for the largest transactions - to all-equity. The peak of the fifth 
merger wave in Europe is characterized by an increase in the number of hostile M&As, largely due to the 
fact that Continental Europe experienced growth in both domestic and cross-border unsolicited bids. The 
UK domestic market attenuates this trend as here we observe a fall in the number of hostile transactions 
compared to the 1980s wave. 
 
 
3. Literature overview. 
 
3.1. Market reaction to takeover announcement. 
 
The empirical literature is unanimous in its conclusion that takeovers create value for the target and 
bidder  shareholders  combined,  with  the  majority  of  the  gains  accruing  to  the  target  shareholders. 
Shareholders of target firms invariably receive large premiums (on average 10% to 30%) relative to the 
pre-announcement share price. Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), Servaes (1991), Kaplan and Weisbach (1992), 
Mulherin and Boone (2000), for instance, report average US target abnormal returns of 29% (for 1963–
86), 24% (for 1972–87), 27% for (1971–82), and 21% (for 1990-99), respectively. Similarly to their US 
counterparts, UK and Continental European targets gain average announcement returns of 24% during the 
period  1955-85  (Franks  and  Harris  1989),  19%  in  1966-91  (Danbolt  2004),  and  13%  in  1990-2001 
(Goergen  and  Renneboog  2004).  Schwert  (1996)  emphasizes  that  the  share  price  reactions  of  target 
shareholders are not limited to the announcement day but commence already 42 days prior to the initial 
public announcement of the bid. Numerous studies report that the price run-up is substantial and often 
even exceeds the announcement effect itself: the run-up is between 13% and 22% over a period of two 
months prior to the bid (Ascquith et al 1983, Dennis and McConnell 1986, Goergen and Renneboog 
2004). These returns imply that the bids are anticipated, and result from rumors, information leakages, or 
insider trading. 
 
There is a considerable contrast between the large share price returns of target firms and the frequently 
negligible returns of bidding firms. Empirical evidence suggests that bidder shareholders realize abnormal Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe 
  8
returns immediately around the announcement day which are insignificantly different from zero. For the 
bidding  firms,  there  is  little  consensus  in  the  literature  about  the  sign  of  the  price  reaction  to  the 
announcement of an M&A. About half of the studies report small negative announcement returns for the 
acquirers (see e.g. Andrade et al. 2001, Mulherin and Boone 2000, Franks et al. 1991, Healy et al. 1992), 
whereas the other half finds zero or small positive announcement abnormal returns (see e.g. Moeller and 
Schlingemann 2005, Schwert 2000, Loderer and Martin 1990, Asquith et al. 1983). The share price run-
up prior to a takeover announcement over a one-month period is positive, but mostly insignificant for 
bidder shareholders (Dennis and McConnell 1986, Smith and Kim 1994, Schwert 1996).  
 
As the target shareholders earn large positive abnormal returns and the bidder shareholders do not lose on 
average, takeovers are expected to increase the combined market value of the merging firms’ assets. The 
empirical literature unanimously documents significant positive announcement effect for the combined 
firm, although the size of the total effect varies across studies. Bradley et al. (1988), Lang et al. (1989), 
and Healy et al. (1992) compute average abnormal returns for the combined firm of 7% for 1963-84, 11% 
for 1968-86, and 9% for 1979-84 respectively. Franks et al. (1991), Kaplan and Weisbach (1992), and 
Mulherin and Boone (2000) report total takeover announcement gains of 4% for different sub-periods 
between 1971 and 1999, whereas Andrade et al. (2001) state that the combined announcement effect for 
the period 1973-98 is 1.8% in the US.  
 
3.2. Determinants of share price reactions. 
 
The M&A literature has shown that a variety of attributes affect the value of bidding and target firms at 
the  announcement  of  corporate  takeovers
2.  First,  the  announcements  of  tender  offers  and  of  hostile 
acquisitions generate higher target returns than the announcement of friendly M&As. In contrast, bidder 
returns on the announcement day are significantly lower in hostile bids than in friendly M&As (see e.g. 
Goergen and Renneboog 2004, Gregory 1997, Franks and Mayer 1996, Servaes 1991).  
 
Second, when the bidding management owns large equity stakes, the share price reactions of bidding 
firms are higher (see e.g. Healy et al. 1997, Agrawal and Mandelker 1987). This suggests that, when 
managers do not own equity, the fact that agency problems in the firm are higher is discounted in the 
share prices. The bidder shareholders may therefore believe that managers with low share participation 
                                                 
2 For an overview of the evidence on the wealth effects of M&A activity and the motives for takeovers, see Jensen 
and Ruback (1983), Jarrell et al. (1988), Agrawal and Jaffe (2000), Bruner (2003), and Martynova and Renneboog 
(2005). Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe 
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give priority to growth strategies (including value-destroying mergers), rather than focus on shareholder 
value maximization.  
 
Third, all-cash bids generate higher target and bidder returns than all-equity acquisitions (see e.g. Moeller 
et al 2004, Andrade et al. 2001, Franks et al. 1991). The announcement that an equity bid is made may 
signal that the bidding managers believe that their firms’ shares are overpriced so that investors adjust the 
bidders’ share prices downwards. This is in line with the fact that managers attempt to time equity issues 
to coincide with surging stock markets or even at the peak of the stock market cycle.  
 
Fourth,  acquiring  firms  with  excess  cash  destroy  value  by  overbidding.  Several  papers  have  shown 
evidence that free cash flow is frequently used for managerial empire building (see e.g. Jensen 1986, 
Servaes 1991, Lang et al. 1991).  
 
Fifth, corporate diversification strategies destroy value (Doukas et al. 2002, Hubbard and Palia 1999, 
Berger and Ofek 1995, Morck et al. 1990). This confirms that companies should not attempt to do what 
investors can do better themselves, i.e. creating a diversified portfolio.  
Sixth, the acquisition of value-companies leads to higher bidder and target returns. Rau and Vermaelen 
(1998) show that the acquisition of firms with low market-to-book ratios generates high abnormal returns 
for the shareholders of the bidding firm whereas the takeover of firms with high market-to-book ratios 
yields substantial negative abnormal returns.  
 
Finally,  target  firms  in  cross-border  acquisitions  tend  to  pocket  larger  abnormal  returns  than  their 
counterparts in domestic bids (Wansley et al. 1983, Dewenter 1995, Danbolt 2004). It follows that the 
share price of bidders acquiring foreign firms significantly underperforms that of bidders participating in 
domestic  takeovers  (Conn  et  al.  2005).  The  market  anticipates  that  regulatory  and  national  cultural 
differences between the bidders’ and targets’ countries may lead to difficulties in managing the post-
merger process (Baldwin and Caves 1991, Schoenberg 1999).  
 
3.3. Motives for takeovers. 
 
The  literature  offers  several  alternatives  as  to  what  motivates  companies  to  participate  in  corporate 
takeovers.  The  key  explanations  are  synergies  and  the  correction  of  managerial  failure.  Typically, 
takeovers (are expected to) create operating and financial synergies. Operating synergies arise through the 
realization of economies of scale and scope, the elimination of duplicate activities, vertical integration, Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe 
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the transfer of knowledge or skills by the bidder’s management team, and a reduction in agency costs by 
bringing organization-specific assets under common ownership (Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987, 1989). 
The creation of operating synergies reduces production and/or distribution costs, yielding an incremental 
cash flow accruing to the firm’s post-merger shareholders. Operating synergies tend to arise mainly when 
the merging firms are in the same or related industries (Comment and Jarrell 1995). Further, operating 
synergies may include acquisition of technology or intangible assets, such as acquisition of knowledge of 
new markets in cross-border takeovers.  
Diversifying takeovers are expected to benefit from financial synergies. Financial synergies may include 
improved cash flow stability, lower bankruptcy probability (Lewellen 1971, Higgins and Schall 1975), 
cheaper access to capital, an internal capital market (Bhide 1990), the use of underutilized tax shields, as 
well as contracting efficiencies created by a reduction in managers’ employment risk (Amihud and Lev 
1981). 
  
The role of hostile acquisitions as a disciplinary force to correct managerial failure is also often cited as a 
motive. In this scenario, hostile takeovers target poorly performing firms and replace underperforming 
management.  Until  recently,  this  disciplinary  market  for  corporate  control  existed  mostly  in  the  US 
(Morck et al. 1988, Bhide 1989, Martin and McConnell 1991). Hasbrouck (1985), Palepu (1986), Morck 
et al. (1989), and Mitchell and Lehn (1990) provide evidence that, prior to the acquisition, US target firms 
in hostile takeovers significantly underperform their peers in friendly M&As. However,  Franks and 
Mayer (1996) cast doubt on the role of the M&A market as a disciplinary device in the UK. Also, a 
growing number of recent empirical studies report that the disciplining function of hostile takeovers is not 
the primary motive for the target firms’ managers to oppose takeover attempts (Ravenscraft and Scherer 
1987, Martin and McConnell 1991, Schwert 2000). Hostility may also result from a bargaining strategy to 
extract  a  higher  premium  for  the  target  shareholders  (Schwert,  2000)  or  from  the  target  directors’ 
viewpoint that the proposed takeover is incompatible with the target’s long-term strategy. 
 
Domestically-oriented companies frequently resort to cross-border takeovers as a means to survive the 
tough international competition in global markets. Expansion abroad also enables companies to exploit 
differences in tax systems and to capture rents resulting from  market inefficiencies such as national 
controls  over  labour  markets  (Scholes  and  Wolfson  1990,  Servaes  and  Zenner  1994).  In  addition, 
imperfect  capital  markets  allow  firms  to  exploit  favourable  exchange  rate  movements  by  moving 
operations to other countries or by acquiring foreign firms (Froot and Stein 1991, Cebenoyan et al. 1992, 
Kang 1993).  
 Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe 
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In this chapter, we investigate the short-term returns for a large sample of intra-European domestic and 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions. We analyze whether the type of offer has an important impact on 
the premium paid for the target’s shares. Furthermore, we look at the possible impact of different means 
of payment (all-cash, all-equity or combinations of cash, equity and loan notes) on the bid premium. 
Given that the level of stock market development and corporate governance regulation differ substantially 
between the UK and Continental Europe, we investigate whether the abnormal returns for targets and 
bidders  of  these  regions  are  significantly  different.  We  also  examine  the  announcement  effect  of 
unsuccessful bids to check whether the market already accounts for this ultimate effect at the moment of 
the first bid announcement. We also study the impact of the stock market bubble by controlling for the 
impact of year-of-bid effects. 
 
4. Data sources, descriptive statistics and methodology. 
 
4.1. Sample selection. 
 
We select  our sample of European  acquisitions launched between  1993  and 2001  –  during  the  fifth 
takeover wave - from the Mergers and Acquisitions Database of the Securities Data Company (SDC), 
which contains detailed historical data on M&As dating back to 1984. We only select domestic and cross-
border intra-European takeovers; both the acquirer and the target are from countries within Continental 
Europe  and  the  UK.  The  deals  also  involve  firms  from  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  as  well  as  the 
European former Soviet countries. Further, we retain only the transactions involving a change in control 
and thus exclude deals intending to buy a mere minority participation. It should be noted that our sample 
includes not only firms that were successfully taken over but also takeover attempts. The resulting list 
comprised 25,240 M&A announcements. 
 
In order to reduce endogeneity problems and enhance the comparability of the deals, we focus only on 
transactions  between  independent  companies.  That  is,  we  exclude  bids  if  the  bidding  party  is  the 
management or the employees, or if the target is a subsidiary. In addition, we avoid dealing with the 
special regulatory environment and accounting issues related to financial institutions: we exclude banks, 
savings banks, unit trusts, mutual funds and pension funds. These filters reduce the dataset to 13,312 
takeover announcements.  
 
We also only retain the takeover deals in which at least one of the participants is a publicly traded 
company on a European stock exchange in order to ensure the availability of sufficient publicly disclosed Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe 
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information about the parties involved and about the bid. This reduces the sample to 5,278 takeover 
announcements. In one fifth of the sample (1,124 announcements), both bidder and target are listed. The 
sample includes 4,671 (88.5%) acquisitions made by bidders listed on a stock exchange. This figure can 
be further divided into 1,124 (21.3%) and 3,547 (67.2%) bids for public and private targets respectively. 
The remaining 607 (11.5%) of the sample constitute bids on publicly traded targets by unlisted bidders.  
 
We also exclude the bids made by the same bidder if these bids occur within less than 300 trading days 
since the previous announcement of a bid. The reason is that we want to avoid biases in the estimation of 
the parameters we need in order to calculate the abnormal returns, because we use an estimation period of 
240 days ending 60 days before the event and an event window spanning 60 days before and 60 days after 
the event day. In addition, if two bids on separate firms by the same acquirer are announced within an 
interval smaller than two months, we eliminate both deals as their event windows would overlap. The 
remaining sample includes 3,216 bid announcements. 
 
We verified the quality of the SDC data by comparing the information on the announcement date, the 
companies’ countries of origin, the transaction value, payment structure, share of control acquired, bid 
completion status, and the target’s attitude towards the bid with the information from LexisNexis, the 
Financial Times, and Factiva as the SDC records do frequently not coincide with those of the other 
sources, corrections were necessary in 36.2% of the deals. 
 
Market and share price returns are gathered from DataStream. We only consider the prices of shares with 
voting rights, defined as ordinary shares or class A shares for the companies issuing dual-class shares. 
Our final sample consists of 2,419 deals involving firms from 28 European countries. This sample is 
representative for the European merger activity during the 1990s for non-financial companies.  
 
4.2. Sample statistics. 
 
During the 1990s, about 70% of the intra-European takeover bids targeted a domestic firm (Table 2). 
However, at the peak of the fifth takeover wave (1998-2000), cross-border bids accounted for more than 
half of all takeovers. In 60% of the takeovers, the deals related to a merger or the acquisition of the full 
equity of the target firm; while in the remainder the bidder acquires absolute control (more than 50% of 
the voting rights).  
 Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe 
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We consider an acquisition as hostile if the board of directors of the target firm rejects the offer for 
whatever reason. Hostility may, for instance, also result from a bargaining strategy to extract a higher 
premium  for  the  target  shareholders  (Schwert  2000)  or  from  the  target  directors’  viewpoint  that  the 
proposed strategic plan underlying the acquisition is incompatible with the target firm’s own strategy. We 
also consider all acquisitions with competing bidders as hostile.
3 Within the unopposed takeovers, we also 
identify the tender offers.
4 Our sample counts 162 (7%) hostile bids, 2257 (93%) friendly M&As, of 
which 473 are tender offers.  
 
The  sample  consists  of  1,941  (80%)  successfully  completed  M&As,  207  (9%)  failed  bids  as  a 
consequence of successful opposition against the bid or a collapse of the friendly takeover negotiations, 
and 271 (11%) pending negotiations. According to SDC, a transaction is classified as pending if it has 
been announced but has not been completed or withdrawn.
5 While the total number of M&As surged, the 
annual number of withdrawn acquisitions remained relatively stable over the 1990s. This implies that the 
likelihood of failing takeover negotiations has decreased over time.  
 
About 37% of the target firms are listed (on a European stock exchange). Sixty-four percent of all the 
M&A announcements are between bidders and targets operating in the same or a related industry
6, while 
the  remainder  are  diversifying  acquisitions.  Out  of  1,721  bids  of  which  the  payment  method  was 
disclosed, the majority (54%) are all-cash offers. Of all the bids involving equity payments, about a half 
are pure equity-exchange offers. The other half are mixed offers that consist of 53% cash, 47% stock, and 
less than 1% of loan notes, on average. In contrast to Section 2 where we considered the whole population 
of European M&As, we cannot conclude based on this sample that there was a shift from cash to equity 
                                                 
3 We do not consider white knight acquisitions as hostile. The reasons are: (i) in the acquisition by a white knight 
target shareholders usually get lower prices than the price offered by the competing (hostile) bidder and (2) white 
knight bidder do not meet opposition from the target firm. There are very few bids with white knights; classifying 
these bids as hostile would not materially affect the results. 
4 A friendly tender offer is a public offer to the target shareholders asking them to sell their shares for cash and/or 
equity at a pre-specified price or equity-exchange ratio, while the target board of directors does not oppose the bid. 
An acquisition is considered to be successful if a sufficient number of shares are tendered such that the bidder gains 
control over the target. In friendly M&As the shareholders of each firm approve the deal. Generally, a majority of 
2/3 or more of shareholder votes is required for the merger or acquisition to succeed (the required percentage may 
vary by country). 
5 We have checked the status of all bids which were labeled as ‘pending’ in the SDC database. To do so, we used 
LexisNexis and Factiva and have changed the completion status when pending bids were ultimately completed or 
withdrawn. For a number of bids, no further information was released in the financial press such that we retained the 
pending status for these bids. It should be noted that many of the pending bids are the ones in which the bidder its 
intention  to  acquire  control  over  the  target  firm,  but  the  acquisition  will  include  several  parts.  That  is,  at  the 
announcement, the bidder acquires a large stake in the target of, say, 20% and it also promises to acquire full control 
(the remaining 30-70%) in a near future. 
6 We define ‘companies in related industries’ as firms for which the primary 2-digit SIC codes coincide. Changing 
this definition to the 3-digit SIC classification, does not materially change the results in the remainder of the chapter.  Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe 
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financing in the late 1990s, as the proportion of all-cash and of all-equity bids remains relatively stable 
over the years.
7  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Table 3 reports the average size of takeovers by the year of announcement. As expected, the average 
value of the bids augments in line with the financial markets boom. The average takeover deal was worth 
US$ 83 million in 1993, rose to US$ 494 million in 1998 and reached a record high at US$ 1.7 billion in 
1999. These averages are considerably influenced by outliers.
8 The equity market collapse in March 2000 
caused an abrupt reduction in the average value of takeover bids. The most expensive takeover offers 
during  the 1990s were  hostile ones. The strikingly  high  average  number  of US$  11 billion in  1999 
incorporates  the  mega  hostile  takeover  of  Mannesmann  by  Vodafone.  Another  very  large  hostile 
takeovers which is included in our sample is the acquisition of Telecom Italia by Olivetti in Italy for US$ 
35 billion; and of Elf Aquitaine by TotalFina in France  for US$ 50 billion. Cross-border M&As tend to 
be larger in value than domestic ones (US$ 1.2 billion versus US$ 0.3 billion, respectively). Among the 
largest cross-border deals, we include the cross-border mergers of equals between Sweden’s Astra and 
Britain’s Zaneca (for a deal value of US$ 35 billion) and between Germany’s Hoechst and France’s 
Rhone-Poulenc (with a deal value of US$ 22 billion). As an example of a large friendly domestic merger 
in France, we point to Carrefour and Promodes (with a deal value of US$ 16 billion). As listed target 
firms are larger than privately-held firms, the average value of a takeover of a listed firm exceeds by more 
than 10 times that of privately-held companies. The average value of intra-industry takeovers is greater 
than that of diversifying bids. There is also a clear relation between the choice of the method of payment 
and the takeover value: the highest transaction value is for all-equity acquisitions whereas the lowest one 
relates to all-cash bids.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
                                                 
7 The sample also includes 698 bids (29%) that lack information about the method of payment. The number of 
undisclosed payment structures partially results from low disclosure requirements in the countries where these bids 
occurred. The highest proportion of M&As with undisclosed payment method is observed in Austria (68% of all 
bids in the country), Germany (67%), and Switzerland (57%). 
8 The largest acquisitions by year are: the US$ 1.5 billion bid by Lagardere Group for Matra-Hachette (both are 
located in France); the US$ 2.5 billion bid in 1994 by Enterprise Oil for Lasmo (both are UK firms); the US$ 5.5 
billion bid in 1995 by Granada Group for Forte (both are UK firms); the US$ 30 billion bid in 1996 by Ciba-Geigy 
for  Sandoz (both  are  located  in  Switzerland); the  US$ 3.5  billion  bid in  1997  by  Rallye  for  Casino  Guichard 
Perrachon (both are French firms); the US$ 35 billion bid in 1998 by Britain’s Zeneca Group for Sweden’s Astra; 
the US$ 202 billion bid in 1999 by Vodaphone on Mannesmann; the US$ 14 billion bid in 2000 by Vodafone for 
Spain’s Airtel; and the US$ 7 billion bid in 2001 by Germany’s E.ON (formerly Veba/Viag) for Britain’s Powergen. Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe 
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Table 4 confirms that the main engine of the takeover activity in Europe is situated in the UK: half of the 
European domestic takeover transactions occur in the UK and one fifth of all the bidding firms in intra-
European cross-border acquisitions are also located in this country. Proportionally, UK firms are less 
frequently  target  firms  in  intra-European  deals:  merely  12.7%  of  the  European  target  firms  are 
headquartered in the UK – a percentage which is similar for Germany and France. Also, most hostile bids 
are concentrated in the UK: 61% of all domestic hostile bids and 41% of all hostile cross-border bids 
(from a target perspective) occurred here. The second and third largest markets for corporate control in 
Europe are Germany and France. Takeovers in these two countries constitute respectively 10% and 13% 
of all domestic bids in our sample. German and French companies are also active acquirers abroad, 
accounting  respectively  for  12  and  15%  of  the  cross-border  M&A  market.  The  Scandinavian  M&A 
market is also sizeable: Scandinavian acquirers conduct 14.6% of all domestic and 22.2% of all cross-
border deals in Europe. Relative to the other major economies in Europe, the takeover activity is Italy is 
remarkably low. The countries that became member states of the European Union in 2004 account for 
15% of all the targets in cross-border M&As. In contrast, domestic acquisitions and cross-border bids 
made by companies from these countries are almost non-existent and merely constitute 2.5% and 1.4% of 
total domestic and cross-border M&A activity, respectively. 
 
4.3. Methodology. 
 
We measure the share price reaction to takeover announcements by computing the abnormal returns 
around the announcement day. Abnormal returns (ARs) are defined as the difference between the realized 
return (R) and a benchmark return (BR), which is the expected return in case there would not have been a 
M&A announcement: 
t i t i t i BR R AR , , , - =                                          (1) 
Where i and t denote the security and the day, respectively.  
To calculate the realized dividend-adjusted daily returns, we use the Datastream return index (RI), the 
daily share prices (P) and the dividends (D):  
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Given the above index (which is also corrected for stock splits, we compute dividend-adjusted daily 
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The existing literature on event studies introduces a variety of methodologies to estimate benchmark 
returns. Most of the studies implicitly assume that the pre-merger strategies of the bidder and target firms 
persist.  Under  this  assumption,  asset  pricing  models  such  as  the  market-adjusted  model,  the  market 
model, or the Fama-French three-factor model are used to predict the benchmark returns based on the 
company’s pre-merger performance. Consistent with the previous studies we also adopt the persistency 
assumption and estimate the market model.
9  
The market model benchmark returns are given by: 
t m i i t i R BR , , ˆ ˆ b a + =                                (5) 
where Rm,t is actual market return on day t. The market model captures the differences in the risk-free rate 
across countries in  i a ˆ and the risk of a security with respect to the market portfolio in  i b ˆ . To insure the 
robustness of our results, we apply four techniques to estimate the parameters. First, we estimate equation 
(5) using OLS regressions. Second, as described in Blume (1979), we adjust the estimated beta for mean-
reversion using expression (6): 
A
i b . Third, we control for non-synchronous trading which may cause a 
downward bias on  i b ˆ  (Dimson 1979, Dimson and Marsh 1983). To calculate a Dimson-beta, 
D
i b , we 
run the regression (7) and sum the 6 beta- coefficients as in equation (8). Fourth, we correct the Dimson-
beta for reversion to the mean by applying Blume (1979).  
i
A
i b b ˆ 67 . 0 34 . 0 × + =                                (6) 
t i t m t i t m t i t m t i t m t i t m t i t m t i i t i R R R R R R R , 2 , 2 , 1 , 1 , , , 1 , 1 , 2 , 2 , 3 , 3 , , e b b b b b b a + + + + + + + = + + + + - - - - - -        (7) 
2 , 1 , , 1 , 2 , 3 , ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
+ + - - - + + + + + = t i t i t i t i t i t i
D
i b b b b b b b                 (8) 
Where  k t m R + ,  for kÎ{-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2} are daily lagged and leading market returns, and  k t i + , ˆ b  for kÎ{-3, 
-2, -1, 0, 1, 2} are the corresponding parameter estimates.  
The market model parameters are estimated over a period of 240 trading days (from 300 to 60 days prior 
to the event day 0). The event day is either the day of the announcement or the first trading day following 
the announcement in case the announcement is made on a non-trading day.  
We employ two different indices (in separate regressions) as proxies for the market. First, since the study 
concerns the European market for corporate control in which cross-border acquisitions constitute one-
third of all transactions, we opt for a European-wide index including companies from the Eurozone, 
                                                 
9  We  exclude  market-adjusted  model  as  it  assumes  that  the  impact  of  the  market  is  similar  across  securities. 
Furthermore, there is a significant variation in the risk-free interest rate across countries: for example, on February 
4, 2004 the 3-month government interest rate was 2.5% in Eurozone, 4.13% in the UK, 0.24% in Switzerland, 
12.68% in Hungary, 5.47% in Poland.  Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe 
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Scandinavia and the UK (assuming that the indices of Western Europe are also capturing the evolution in 
Central Europe). As this index ought to consist of large and madcap-firms, we choose the MSCI Europe 
Index  and  the  S&P  Europe  350.  Second,  in  order  to  capture  the  specifics  of  corporate  governance 
regulation in each country and their impact on corporate financial performance, we also estimate the 
abnormal returns using local market indices. For each country, we take the all-share index of the main 
national stock exchange. These indices are obtained from DataStream.  
We calculate the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for N securities over different event 
windows (from day t1 to day t2 ) as follows: 
￿￿ ￿
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where ￿ denotes an event window (t1, t2), for –60 £ t1 < t2 £ +60. 
To tests the significance of the CAARS, we compute the standard parametric test statistics as discussed in 
detail  by  Brown  and  Warner  (1985),  and  one  non-parametric  rank  statistic,  developed  by  Corrado 
(1989).
10 The portfolio test statistic assumes that the ARs are larger for securities with higher variance. 
Hence, equal weights are given to the returns of individual securities. The statistic follows a Student-t 
distribution, and is approximately standard normal under the null hypothesis. The portfolio test statistics 
is calculated as: 
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where  ) ( ˆ t s CAAR is the cross-sectional sample standard deviation of CAARs over the event window ￿ 
for the sample of N securities: 
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Where  i s ˆ   is  an  estimator  for  the  standard  deviation  of  the  ARs  for  security  i  computed  over  the 
estimation window (T0i, T1i): 
￿
=
- -
-
=
i
i
T
T t
t m i i t i
i
i R R
L
1
0
2
, , ) ˆ ˆ (
2
1 ˆ b a s                           (12) 
where Li is the number of observations for security i in the estimation window (T0i, T1i) and equals 240 
(T0i = -300 and T1i = -60). The standard deviation of the CARs in (11) is based on the assumption that 
ARs of different securities are uncorrelated. This is generally the case when there is no overlap in the 
                                                 
10  The  parametric  statistics  differ  with  regard  to  their  assumptions  about  whether  or  not  abnormal  returns  are 
constant across securities or increase with the variance. Both parametric test statistics are based on the assumption of 
joint normality of the abnormal returns. Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe 
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event windows of individual securities. If the assumption were not valid, then the portfolio statistic would 
be biased. 
 
Our second parametric tests statistic, the standardized test statistic, assumes that the true ARs are constant 
across securities. This statistic gives more weight to the securities with lower variance of the ARs. A 
correct  specification  requires  cross-sectional  independence  of  ARs.  Under  the  null  hypothesis,  the 
distribution of this test statistic is Student-t, which converges to the standard normal distribution as the 
number of securities increases. The statistic is calculated as: 
￿
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Where  ) ( ˆ t s i CAR   denotes  the  sample  standard  deviation  of  the  CARs  of  the  individual  securities 
referring to the event window ￿: 
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The Corrado test statistic is non-parametric and hence free of any specific assumptions on the return 
distribution. Moreover, this test statistic does not require the returns to be symmetrically distributed as is 
necessary for a correct specification of the non-parametric tests.
11 The test can also handle the problem of 
cross-sectional dependence of ARs. The Corrado test ranks each security’s time series of ARs and then 
aggregates these individual security’s ranks into a time series of mean portfolio ranks. Under the null 
hypothesis of zero abnormal performance on the event day (window), the distribution of the rank statistic 
converges to the standard normal distribution. The statistic is specified as follows:  
￿
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The standard deviation  ) ( ˆ K s  is estimated using the entire sample of securities and their time series of 
ARs:  
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where Kij denotes the rank of abnormal returns (ARs or CARs) in security i’s time series in the estimation 
and event periods combined: 
) ( ij ij AR rank K =                       (17) 
                                                 
11 The requirement of symmetry is often violated when daily data are considered. According to Brown and Warner 
(1985) and Campbell et al. (1997), it is likely that the cross-sectional distribution of daily abnormal returns is 
skewed to the right.  Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe 
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and j stands for the order in the time sequence of ARs over the analyzed period. Thus, if daily ARs are 
considered, then j = -300, …, +60. When multiple-day CARs are considered, j is the order of windows of 
￿-day length composing the period (-300, +60). We denote Ho i K , the rank of the abnormal returns (CARs) 
of  security  i  on  the  event  day  (window)  for  which  we  hypothesize  and  test  that  the  returns  are 
insignificant. L denotes the number of observations (ARs or CARs) comprising the time series for each 
security, such that L equals 360 for daily ARs and L equals 360/￿ for CARs over the window of ￿ days. 
The rank test uses the fact that the expected rank under the null hypothesis is 0.5(L + 1).  
 
Campbell and Wasley (1996) show that, compared to parametric test statistics, the rank test is consistently 
best-specified and the most powerful test statistic across numerous event conditions, such as multi-day 
event periods, clustered event days, and increases in variance on the event day.  
 
5. Results. 
 
In this section, we focus on univariate analyses of CAARs for target and bidding firms realized in intra-
European M&As. We relate the CAARs to the various characteristics of target and bidding firms and of 
the bid itself: these include the location of the target (domestic versus cross-border M&As), the type of 
the takeover (hostile bid, tender offer, merger, friendly acquisition), the nationality and legal origin of the 
bidding and target firms, the means of payment (all-cash, all-equity, or mixed offer), the success or failure 
of the negotiations (successfully completed, pending, or withdrawn), the sub-period of the takeover wave 
in which the bid was announced (the run-up, the peak and the decline of the wave), the legal status of the 
target firm (listed versus privately-held), the corporate strategy (focus versus diversification strategy), and 
the form of the takeover (a full acquisition versus a partial control acquisition).  
 
5.1. Target versus bidding firms. 
 
As a bidding firm is expected to create significant additional corporate value when it acquires a target 
firm, the target shareholders will only be enticed to sell their share stakes if they are offered a substantial 
premium. This premium (the future synergetic value) should be immediately reflected in the target firms’ 
share  prices.  Figure  15  depicts  that  the  announcement  of  a  takeover  bid  causes  substantial  positive 
abnormal returns for the target shareholders: on the event day, an abnormal return of 9% is realized. In 
addition, there is a significant increase in target share prices over the period of two months (about 40 
trading days) prior to the initial public announcement. On average, investors owning shares in the target 
firm for a period starting 2 months prior to the event day and selling their shares at the end of the event Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe 
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day would earn a return of 21% (Table 5). After about 25 trading days subsequent to the event day, the 
CAAR decreases by 2% due to the fact that some bids are withdrawn as a consequence of successful 
opposition  by  the  target’s  board  of  directors  or  that  delays  in  takeover  negotiations  raise  investors’ 
concerns about the ultimate success of the bid. 
 
In comparison to the target CAARs, the price reactions for the bidding firms are modest: Figure 16 shows 
a small (though statistically significant at the 1% level) abnormal return of 0.5%. Over a 10-day window 
centred around the event day, the statistically significant CAAR amounts to 0.8%. Strikingly, the CAARs 
of  the  bidding  firm  generated  over  a  3-month  period  (–3%)  subsequent  to  the  bid  are  significantly 
negative. This negative return includes the effects of all revisions in expectations and in the offer price 
and may therefore be a more complete measure of the takeover wealth effect for the shareholders of the 
bidding  firm.  In  the  next  subsections,  we  show  that  the  negative  pattern  of  the  post-announcement 
abnormal returns is affected by various characteristics of the transaction, such as opposition by the board 
of the target firm against the bid, the payment method, and the expected (or realized) outcome of the 
M&A negotiations.  
[Insert about here Table 5, Figures 15 and 16] 
 
5.2. Hostile bids versus friendly mergers and acquisitions. 
 
To analyze the market reactions to the different types of takeovers, we partition all bids into three groups 
based on the target firm’s attitude towards the bid (hostile vs. friendly) and by the form of the bid (tender 
offer versus negotiated M&A). For all of these types, there is a strong positive increase (statistically 
significant at the 1% level) in the target share prices at the bid announcement, as shown by Figure 17. 
Expectedly, hostile bids generate the largest abnormal returns (15%) to the target shareholders on the 
announcement day. The returns of hostile takeover bids are significantly higher than the ones for friendly 
M&As and unopposed tender offers: the announcement effect is only 3% for friendly M&As and 12% for 
unopposed tender offers. We do not consider unopposed tender offers as hostile, as (by definition) they 
are not opposed by the board of directors of the target firm. However, As the bidder bypasses the board of 
directors of the target firm with a tender offer and addresses the target shareholders directly, a tender 
offer, even unopposed, is somewhere between a friendly bid and a hostile one. Therefore, we expect 
unopposed tender offers to trigger large share price increases for the target firms. When a hostile bid is 
made,  the  share  price  of  the  target  immediately  reflects  the  expectation  that opposition  will  lead  to 
upward revisions of the offer price. Likewise, an offer made directly to the shareholders by means of a 
tender offer is also usually occurring at a substantial premium above the pre-announcement market price. Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe 
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Figure 17 also unveils that there are large differences in the share price run-ups between friendly and 
hostile takeover bids. A hostile acquisition generates a CAAR of more than 30% over a 2-month period 
preceding and including the announcement day. In contrast, the target share prices of friendly M&As 
(excluding unopposed tender offers) significantly underperform those of hostile bids and tender offers 
both before and after the deal announcement. Over the holding period of 6 months centred on the event 
day, friendly M&As trigger a cumulative average abnormal return of only 10%, whereas the wealth 
effects amount to 32% for unopposed tender offers and 44% for hostile bids.  
 
[Insert about here Figures 17 and 18] 
 
Figure 18 reports the CAARs for the bidding firms by attitude and by type of takeover. The bidding 
firms’ shareholders clearly react differently to the announcements of friendly M&As, unopposed tender 
offers or hostile bids. In the two-month period prior to the bid, the CAARs of the bidding firms decrease 
slightly in the case of friendly M&As, whereas those for bids which will later be publicly announced as 
tender offers or hostile bids are significantly positive at 2.9% and 1.6%, respectively. It seems that a 
takeover via a tender offer or hostile bid is anticipated by the market and evaluated positively. On the 
event day, the share price endures a small negative price correction. The reason is that the shareholders of 
the bidding firms fear that their firm will offer too high a premium in case of bid opposition or in case of a 
direct offer to the target shareholders as upward price revisions erode the synergy value accruing to the 
bidder.  The  announcement  of  a  friendly  M&A  is  greeted  favourably  by  the  market  as  the  ARs  are 
significantly positive (0.8%).  
 
Irrespective of the takeover type, all bidders realize significant decreases in market value over the three-
month post-event period. It seems that the market price reactions to the announcements (and prior to the 
event) are overoptimistic and that the bidders’ shareholders have second thoughts about the transaction. 
The abnormal returns for the bidding firms accumulated starting three months prior through three months 
after  the  bid  announcement  are  virtually  zero  (0.02%)  in  unopposed  tender  offers,  but  significantly 
negative in hostile bids and friendly M&As (-1.6% and -4.4%, respectively).  
 
 
5.3. Means of payment in takeover bids.  
 
The means of payment is generally considered to be an important signal of the quality of the target firm 
(or the potential synergy value). If the offer consists of cash, the bidding firm signals that it wants to pay Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe 
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off the target shareholders in order to not share future value increases of the merged firms. In contrast, an 
all-equity offer signals that the bidders’ shareholders intend to keep the target shareholders involved in 
the merged company and share its risk. Hence, the target shareholders believe that their firm is peach 
when the bidder makes a cash offer while their firm may be less valuable when an all-equity bid is made. 
Asymmetric  information  between  the  bidder’s  management  and  outside  investors  may  influence  the 
choice  of  the  means  of  payment  in  an  acquisition  and  the  consequent  market  reaction  to  the 
announcement of the payment method. We report strong evidence in Figure 19 that the target’s share 
price reaction is indeed sensitive to the means of payment in a takeover bid. All-cash offers as well as 
bids combining cash, equity and loan notes trigger substantially higher abnormal returns (respectively, 
12%  and  10%  at  the  announcement)  than  all-equity  bids  (7%).  Figure  19  also  shows  that  the 
announcement effect combined with the price run-up (over two months prior to the event day) yields 
CAARs almost 26% and 24% for all-cash bids and combined offers, respectively. The corresponding 
return for all-equity bids is merely 15%. Regardless of the event window, the CAARs of cash-financed 
bids are significantly higher than those of equity-financed bids at the 1% significance level. Strikingly, 
acquisitions with undisclosed payment method hardly lead to a price change at the announcement (at 
0.5% which is insignificantly different from zero). The lack of information on such bids is even penalized 
by the market as the share price decreases by 4% over three-month period subsequent to the event day. 
 
[Insert about here Figures 19 and 20] 
 
If the managers of a bidding firm are convinced that the true value of their firm’s shares is worth more 
than the current share price, they will prefer not to issue equity (to finance an all-equity bid or a mixed 
offer) but to finance the acquisition with cash. Hence, the market may interpret the financing choice as a 
signal about firm’s under- or overvaluation and revise the share price of the firm offering cash (equity) 
upwards (downwards). Thus, a negative price correction is expected for all-equity bids and a positive one 
for all-cash bids. Figure 20 confirms this: the bidder’s shareholders greet offers involving cash payments 
more  favourably  (0.6%  for  all-cash  and  0.9%  for  mixed  bids)  than  all-equity  offers  (of  which  the 
abnormal returns are indistinguishable from zero). In the period following the bid announcement, the 
bidders’ share prices all decline but bids involving equity payments decline substantially more than all-
cash offers. The CAARs over a 6-month period of all-cash bids are not significantly different from zero 
(at –0.9%), whereas those of all-equity bids and mixed offers are significantly negative (-2.2% and –
2.8%,  respectively).  This  negative  price  reaction  to  bids  involving  equity  confirms  that  the  market 
believes that equity payments transmit a signal that the bidding firm is overvalued.  
 Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe 
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5.4. Domestic versus cross-border acquisitions. 
 
As pointed out above, 70% of the intra-European M&As are domestic deals. Figure 21 depicts that the 
announcement effect of domestic and cross-border targets amounts to 10% and 8%, respectively. This 
difference is statistically significant. When we add the price run-up (from 40 trading days prior to the 
event), the difference of nearly 3% remains significant. One reason why premiums are on average higher 
for domestic targets than for cross-border targets is that the sample of domestic M&As includes a higher 
proportion of UK targets (50% versus only 13% in the cross-border takeover sample). Furthermore, we 
have shown above that hostile acquisitions occur more frequently in the UK than in Continental Europe 
and trigger larger price reactions. Furthermore, the sample composition may give another reason for the 
difference in premiums: 15% of the cross-border targets are companies from countries that joined the EU 
in 2004 or are expected to join in 2007. The CAARs of target firms from these countries in the domestic 
takeover sample amounts to merely 2.5%. The share prices of these Central European cross-border targets 
are virtually unaffected by the announcement of a takeover bid and even sharply decline after the event 
day.  
 
Figure 22 also reveals that bidding firms engaging in cross-border bids experience lower announcement 
effects than those undertaking domestic acquisitions (0.4% versus 0.6%, respectively), the difference of 
which is statistically significant. Subsequent to the event day, the negative price correction for bidding 
firms is larger for cross-border bids than for domestic ones (-3.6% versus –2.5%). Some of the reasons for 
these effects are presented in the subsequent two subsections. 
 
[Insert about here Figures 21 and 22] 
 
5.5. UK versus Continental European bids. 
 
As 85% of the companies listed on the London Stock Exchange are widely held, they are continually up 
for auction (Goergen and Renneboog 2004). Thus, an active market for corporate control takes place in 
the UK. In contrast, the number of listed firms in Continental Europe is much lower and most listed firms 
(around  85  to  90% in Germany  and  France)  have  concentrated  ownership  or  control (for  a  detailed 
overview of ownership and control in Europe, see Barca and Becht 2001, Faccio and Lang 2002). Hence, 
unsurprisingly, about half of the sample of target and bidding firms listed on a stock exchange are located 
in the UK or Ireland and hostile acquisitions are more rare in Continental Europe. As there is a high 
degree of disclosure in the UK, a liquid and well-developed equity market (McCahery and Renneboog Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe 
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2002) and a higher degree of shareholder protection (La Porta et al. 1998), we expect higher premiums in 
takeover bids involving UK firms.  
 
We do indeed confirm this conjecture: the announcement effect is substantially larger for the UK target 
firms in domestic bids (13.7%) than for Continental European targets (4.5%). This significant difference 
even augments over the period including the event day and the price run-up over 2 months prior to the 
event: the premiums amount to 28% and 12% for UK and European targets, respectively (Figure 23). The 
Continental European bidders’ CAARs over the same period are similar to those of the UK bidders (they 
amount to about 1%). Still, Figure 24 shows that the negative price correction that takes place over the 
three months subsequent to the bid announcement is substantially larger for acquirers from Continental 
Europe.
12  
 
When we examine the short-term wealth effects in cross-border acquisitions from the perspective of the 
location  of  the  target  (UK  versus  Continental  Europe),  we  find  the  following.  When  UK  firms  are 
acquired, the premium offered towers above that of Continental European target firms: 13.8% versus 
5.9% at the announcement (Figure 23). When we add the price run-up period, the numbers increase to 
37% versus 14%, respectively. Over a six-month period around the event day, UK target firms’ short-term 
wealth effects amount to 48.1% while their Continental European counterparts’ share prices rise to 17.3% 
on average. This difference in premiums may reflect a more strict takeover legislation in the UK than in 
the Continental European countries, which protects the target shareholders from expropriation by the 
bidder and gives the target shareholders more power to extract higher premiums in takeover negotiations 
(Goergen et al. 2005). 
 
The short-term wealth effects of foreign firms bidding on UK targets is not significantly different from 
zero, whereas that of foreign firms attempting to acquire firms in Continental Europe is 0.5% which is 
statistically significantly different from zero (Figure 24). The reason a bid on a Continental target is 
hailed more positively than a bid on a UK target may lie in the fact that the premiums paid for Continental 
targets are substantially lower (see above).  
 
When we focus on the location of the bidding firm (UK versus Continental Europe), we arrive at the 
following results. There is little difference between the CAARs over the event day and the price run-up 
period for target firms approached by a UK or a Continental European bidder (21.5% versus 20.5%, 
respectively). The shareholders of Continental European bidding firms react more positively to cross-
                                                 
12 Appendices A and B show the CAARs of the bidding and target firms by country of origin.  Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe 
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border bids than the shareholders of UK bidding firms, as the announcement effect for bidders are 0.5% 
and 0.2% respectively.  
 
[Insert about here Figures 23 and 24] 
 
5.6. Legal origin of the bidding and target firms. 
 
Although the difference in CAARs between Continental Europe and the UK is remarkable, there is also 
some variation in the market reaction to takeovers across the Continental European countries. Differences 
in the laws and their enforcement may explain a part of this variation. Rossi and Volpin (2004) show that 
the legal environment and takeover regulation are important determinants of the takeover gains. They 
report that takeover premiums are higher in countries with higher shareholder protection and in countries 
where  the  mandatory  bid  requirement  is  enforced  by  law.  To  control  for  the  impact  of  the  legal 
environment on takeover premiums, we classify all acquisitions into five groups according to the legal 
origin  of  the  bidding  (and  target)  firms,  following  LaPorta  et  al. (1998).  Countries  from  the  former 
communist block are classified according to their (staged) accession to the European Union, as this event 
has had an important impact on their regulatory environment.  
 
Figure 25 exhibits the marked differences in target share price reactions at the announcement, over the 
price run-up period and over the post-announcement period for domestic bids by legal origin. As also 
documented above, the target firms of English legal origin experience very large wealth effects over all 
windows (around, before and after the event day). Importantly, target firms in Scandinavian countries, 
which have a corporate governance legislation and institutional financial environment close to that of the 
UK (LaPorta et al. 1998), also exhibit strongly positive CAARs (of 21% over the event day and the price 
run-up period). While the target firms in countries of the recent (2004) and the upcoming (2007-2009) EU 
enlargement have the lowest announcement effect (–0.5%), that of target firms of French and German 
legal origin is also particularly low (with CAARs of 1.7% and 2.3%, respectively).  
 
Figure 26 documents that the legal origin of the bidding firm also has a clear impact on the bidders’ 
abnormal returns in domestic bids. Takeovers by bidding firms of English, German and Scandinavian 
legal origin generate significantly positive announcement effects whereas those by bidders of French legal 
origin  and  of  the  EU  enlargement  are  not  different  from  zero.  Over  time  windows  of  6  months 
symmetrically around the event date, we find that the bidders in domestic takeovers face negative share 
price movements (for firms in countries of the recent EU enlargement and of countries of German legal Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe 
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original) or abnormal returns indistinguishable from zero (for firms of French, UK and Scandinavian legal 
origin).  
 
[Insert about here Figures 25 and 26] 
 
Turning to cross-border acquisitions, we show in Figure 27 that the CAARs spanning the 2-month price 
run-up period as well as the announcement effect is highest for targets of English legal origin (37%), 
followed by the effect for those of Scandinavian legal origin (30%), of French legal origin (14%) and of 
German legal origin (13%). The corresponding effect for targets from the Central European countries is 
indistinguishable from zero (Figure 28).  
 
[Insert about here Figures 27 and 28] 
 
Given that the corporate governance regime of the acquiring firm is imposed on the target firm
13, it is 
important to consider the wealth effect after classifying the cross-border takeover bids based on the legal 
origin of the acquirer. Figure 29 discloses that the differences between the target share price reactions by 
legal origin of the bidder are less heterogeneous than those classified by legal origin of the target. As 
usual, we find that the announcement market reaction when bidders are of English legal origin is larger 
than those when bidders of the other legal origins. Figure 30 shows that the bidders’ share prices are close 
to zero at the announcement.  
 
[Insert about here Figures 29 and 30] 
 
5.7. Bid completion status. 
 
In this section, we address the question as to whether the markets are able to anticipate the ultimate 
success or failure of the M&A negotiations. The negotiations are assumed to be ultimately successful if 
the acquired number of shares is sufficient for the bidder to exercise control, or if the required majority of 
the target shareholders accept the bid. Out of the 2,419 announcements in our sample 207 ultimately 
failed,  and  271  resulted  in  prolonged  negotiations  between  the  bidder  and  the  target’s  shareholders 
(pending bids). Irrespective of the ultimate success or failure of the bid, we find significantly positive 
                                                 
13 According to international law, when a foreign firm acquires 100% of a domestic firm, the nationality of the latter 
changes.  Hence,  the  target  firm  usually  adopts  the  accounting  standards,  disclosure  practices,  and  governance 
structures of the acquiring firm (Bris and Cabolis 2004, and Rossi and Volpin 2004). Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe 
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announcement effects for the target firms (Figure 31). The event-day effect is significantly larger (by 1% 
to 2%) for the successful bids than for the failures and pending deals. However, over the 2-month window 
prior to and including the event day, there is no difference in the CAARs between failed and successful 
bids  (21.8%  versus  21.5%).  For  the  same  period,  pending  acquisitions  underperform  successful  and 
withdrawn bids by 3 to 5%.  
 
Figure 31 shows that whereas the CAARs for the target firms in successful bids are not significantly 
different from zero subsequent to the announcement, the abnormal returns for the failed bids rise (by 
about 10%) over the 3 months post-event window. This may result from the fact that the market is 
relieved that the bid is withdrawn and anticipates other bids in the near future. In contrast, the CAARs for 
targets in pending acquisitions fall (by about 5%) over the 40 days after the initial announcement, most 
likely as a reaction to the ongoing uncertainty.  
 
The announcement effect for unsuccessful bidders is negative (-0.6%), but not statistically significant 
from zero (Figure 32). The total wealth effects (over a 6-month time span) of completed, pending, and 
withdrawn takeovers range between –6% and –3%, with most losses occurring to the bidding firms facing 
difficulties to complete the takeover negotiations.  
 
[Insert about here Figures 31 and 32] 
 
5.8. Focus versus diversification strategies. 
 
Although conglomerate acquisitions are expected to create operational and/or financial synergies, the 
creation of diversified firms is associated with a number of disadvantages such as rent-seeking behavior 
by divisional managers (Scharfstein and Stein 2000), bargaining problems within the firm (Rajan et al. 
2000),  or  bureaucratic  rigidity  (Shin  and  Stulz  1998).  These  disadvantages  of  diversification  may 
outweigh the alleged synergies and result in wealth destruction for the shareholders of both the bidding 
and target firms.  
 
Our sample of 2,419 takeover announcements includes 861 conglomerate takeovers in which bidder and 
target operate in unrelated industries. Figure 33 compares the CAARs of the target firms in diversifying 
takeovers with those of M&As in industry-related or focus-oriented M&As. Irrespective of the corporate 
strategy,  shareholders  of  the  target  firm  can  pocket  significantly  positive  abnormal  returns  at  the 
announcement day. However, these returns are significantly larger (by 2.4%) for unrelated takeovers. Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe 
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Over the period including the announcement day and the price run-up period, the targets of diversifying 
takeovers enjoy a CAAR of about 24% whereas the ones of takeovers with a focus strategy experience a 
CAAR of about 19%. Regardless of the length of the window, diversifying takeovers beat M&As with a 
focus  strategy  in  the  short-run.  The  difference  is  likely  to  be  a  result  of  more  aggressive  bids  in 
diversifying takeovers and greater willingness of bidders to over-pay for the unrelated target firms. This is 
because  diversifying  acquisitions  are  more  likely  to  occur  when  bidding  firms  suffer  from  agency 
conflicts and free-cash flow problems. In the literature, there is evidence that the management of such 
firms often acquires unrelated business for personal reasons (e.g. for ‘empire building’ purposes) at the 
expense of shareholder value or that managerial hubris leads bidding firms to pay too high premiums.  
 
These conjectures are consistent with our results for bidding companies: diversification destroys value on 
average and is largely driven by the personal objectives of managers. Figure 34 shows that bidding firms 
have  significantly  higher  short-run wealth  effects  around  the  announcement  of  a business  expansion 
within the core industry in comparison to the abnormal returns around the announcement of business 
diversification (0.63% versus 0.36%). Also, it appears that the market anticipates the focus strategy of the 
bidder, because there is a statistically significant run-up in the bidder’s share price over the two-month 
period prior to the event day. While the share price augments to 1.4% preceding the intra-industry bid 
announcement,  it  declines  by  the  same  percentage  preceding  the  announcement  of  a  conglomerate 
takeover.  
 
[Insert about here Figures 33 and 34] 
 
5.9. Public versus private target firms. 
 
Acquisitions of privately-held companies account for the majority of the intra-European acquisitions, 
namely more than 60%. The theoretical and empirical literature suggests that bids for such firms may lead 
to bidder returns that exceed those obtained in the bids for public firms (Chang 1998, Moeller et al. 2004, 
Faccio et al. 2004). The fact that the shares of privately-held firms are by definition illiquid, may create a 
price discount. Also, privately-held firms are frequently controlled by one investor or investor group with 
which  negotiations  may  have  a  better  chance  to  succeed than  when  a  public  tender  offer  has  to  be 
launched. However, the acquisition of a private firm may entail considerably more risk for the acquirer 
due to the fact that less reliable information about the true value and growth potential of the firm is 
available. Figure 35 exhibits that the announcement of an acquisition of a private firm causes significantly 
positive abnormal returns of 0.8% to the bidder’s shareholders, whereas the announcement of a bid for a Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe 
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public firm results in an (insignificantly) negative return of –0.1%. Moeller et al. (2004) and Faccio et al. 
(2004) confirm that a bid on a private target results in substantially higher announcement CAARs to the 
bidders than a bid on a public firm. 
 
In contrast, the post-announcement returns over longer time windows decline to almost -3% when a 
private firm is acquired and to -1.3% when a listed firm is taken over (both percentages are significant at 
the 1% level). This result is in line with Bradley and Sundaram (2004) who report that the two-year post-
announcement returns in takeovers of a public target are insignificant from zero, whereas these returns are 
significantly negative when the target is private. 
 
[Insert about here Figure 35] 
 
5.10. Full versus partial acquisitions. 
 
Figure 36 depicts that when a firm announces it intention to acquire full control of a target firm by 
bidding on the entire equity capital, the abnormal returns to the target firm’s shareholders are significantly 
higher than when a firm merely intends to acquire majority control. At the announcement day, the share 
price of the target subject to a full acquisition rises by 12%, an increase which is more than five times 
larger than the abnormal return of a target subject to the partial control acquisition. Investors purchasing 
equity of the target firm three months prior to a full takeover and selling the shares at the end of three 
months subsequent to the announcement earn a CAAR of 31%. In contrast, only 14% can be pocketed 
over the same period in case of a partial acquisition. The lower returns for partial control acquisitions may 
reflect the concern that a control transfer may load to expropriation of the rights of the remaining minority 
shareholders. 
However, Figure 37 exhibits that bidder’s shareholders also dislike partial acquisitions. Although the 
announcement effect of partial acquisitions is significantly positive (0.4%), it is notably lower than the 
announcement effect of the full takeover (0.6%). Also, the acquisition of a majority interest is associated 
with significant negative abnormal returns both prior and after the transaction announcement whereas a 
full acquisition is preceded by a significant increase in the equity value of the bidding firm. In sum, 
investors holding shares of the bidding firm over the six-month period centred around the event day 
accumulate significant losses of –5% in case of a partial acquisition, whereas those holding shares in full 
takeovers obtain returns insignificantly different from zero.  
 
[Insert about here Figures 36 and 37] Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe 
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5.11. The good, the bad and the ugly (takeovers at the start, the peak, and the decline of the fifth 
takeover wave). 
 
M&A activity during the 1990s was characterized by continual increases in the number of takeovers and 
in the average bid value. The increase in value of intra-European takeovers grew by more than 280% over 
the period of 1996–99. The year 1999 was not only remarkable in terms of the total bid value (US$ 1.3 
million), but also in terms of the number of hostile acquisitions: there were 44 hostile offers compared to 
an average of 19 in previous years. Shelton (2000) reports that bidder gains decline during takeover peaks 
which suggests that bidders then tend to bid more aggressively. They also show that bidders display a 
greater tendency to over-pay and to undertake more risky M&As. Harford (2003) confirms that takeovers 
occurring at a later stage of the wave trigger lower abnormal returns to the bidder’s shareholders than 
those at the beginning of the wave. They interpret this finding as resulting from more limited information 
processing, managerial hubris, and managerial self-interest. A similar decline in takeover profitability 
over the 1990s wave is documented in Moeller et al. (2005). They argue that their evidence supports 
Jensen (2004): high valuations increase managerial discretion, making it possible for executives to make 
poor acquisitions when they have run out of good ones.  
 
Our sample includes 857 (35%) bids that occur in the beginning of the fifth wave (1993-96), 931 (38%) 
bids in the middle of the wave (1997-99), and 630 (27%) bids in the period when the M&A activity slows 
down (2000-01). Figure 38 shows significant differences in terms of the price reaction to bids of the three 
sub-periods of the takeover wave. At the announcement day, the target firms gain an average premium of 
8% prior to 1997, 10% in 1997-99, and 9% in 2000-01. The differences between the three figures are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The second stage of the takeover wave is also standing out in 
terms of the price run-up for target firms: it amounts to 13% (up from 8% observed in 1993-1996). Over 
longer time windows, for instance over a 6-month window symmetrically around the event day, the post-
1999 bids yield lower CAARs (21%) than those in 1997-1999 (31%) and those of the pre-1997 bids 
(25%). From Figure 38, it is clear that the target shareholders gain most at the peak of the takeover wave, 
but at whose expense? Clearly, Figure 39 shows that the bidders’ shareholders do not seem to realize yet 
that their firm may be overpaying at the peak of the takeover wave. The sum of the price run-ups and the 
announcement effects for takeover bids at the beginning, peak and decline of the wave are respectively: 
0.19%,  1.47%  and  1.12%.  However,  when  we  calculate  CAARs  over  longer  time  windows  (e.g.  6 
months), it seems that the bidder shareholders realize that the bids may have been excessive at the peak 
and at the decline over the takeover wave: the CAARs amount to 0.52% (1993-96), -1.30% (1997-99) and Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe 
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–9.87% (2000-01).
14  It  should  be noted  that the  substantial  decline subsequent to the  M&A peak  is 
already corrected for the strong downward equity market movement. From the middle of 2000, the M&A 
climate has turned bleak and the stock market decline has made bidder shareholders very pessimistic 
about future synergies of the takeovers. Thus, our evidence shows that from a bidder’s perspective, good 
M&As have turned bad (and even ugly) due to the reasons given above (e.g. managerial hubris and self-
interest, herding).  
[Insert about here Figures 38 and 39] 
 
6. Conclusions. 
  
This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the European takeover market. We examine the main 
features of the domestic and cross-border corporate takeovers facing European companies in 1990-2001 
and contrast them to those of the takeovers of the fourth takeover wave (1984-1989). Our analysis reveals 
that (i) a substantial proportion of intra-European M&As in the 1990s were cross-border transactions; (ii) 
both cross-border and domestic M&A activity tended to occur between firms in related industries; (iii) the 
financial structure of takeover bids in the 1990s switched from a dominance of cash to a combination of 
equity, debt and cash, and – specifically for the largest transactions - to all-equity; (iv) the number of 
hostile bids in Continental Europe increased over the 1990s, whereas the number of hostile transactions in 
the UK domestic market has decreased compared to the 1980s wave. These characteristics of the M&A 
sample suggest that takeovers in the 1990s mainly occurred for reasons of cost cutting, expanding into 
new markets, or exploiting the mispricing premium.  
 
The  bulk  of  European  M&As  of  the  1990s  was  expected  to  improve  efficiency  as  they  triggered 
substantial share price increases at the announcement, most of which were captured by the target-firm 
shareholders. We find large announcement effects (of 9%) for the target firms compared to a statistically 
significant announcement effect of merely 0.5% for the bidders. Including the price run-up, the share 
price reaction amounts to 21% for the targets and 0.9% for the bidders. However, we show that market 
expectations about takeover profitability depend on the different attributes of the bids. For instance, the 
type  of  takeover  bid  is  an  important  determinant:  hostile  takeovers  trigger  substantially  larger  price 
reactions to the target shareholders (15.5% on the event day) than friendly M&As (3%). This stands in 
marked contrast with the share price reaction of bidding firms: a hostile acquisition triggers a negative 
                                                 
14 This result is unlikely to be driven by outliers, as the median value of CARs over window [-60, +60] for takeovers 
in 2000-2001 equals -5.4% (Q25= -24% and Q75= 21%).  Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe 
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abnormal return of -0.4% whereas that of a merger or friendly acquisition generates a positive abnormal 
return of 0.8%.  
 
There is also strong evidence that the means of payment has a large impact on the share prices of bidder 
and  target.  All-cash  offers  trigger  abnormal  returns  of  almost  12%  upon  announcement  which  is 
significantly higher than the average returns (of 7%) in all-equity offers. All-equity bids are more frequent 
in large transactions and in friendly mergers and acquisitions. In the three-month period subsequent the 
bid announcements, deals involving equity payments are associated with substantially larger declines in 
bidders’ share price than all-cash offers.  
 
Domestic mergers or acquisitions trigger higher wealth effects to the target shareholders than cross-border 
operations. However, the premiums paid depend on the location of the target. When a UK target is 
involved, the abnormal returns are higher than those of bids involving a Continental European target. 
Further, when we partition our sample based on the legal origin of target and bidding firms, we find that 
target firms of French, German, and EU-accession legal origins earn the lowest abnormal return upon the 
bid announcement, whereas UK and Scandinavian targets earn most. The evidence suggests that the 
differences in level of stock market development and corporate governance regulation across countries of 
different legal origins have a large impact on premiums paid in takeovers.  
 
We  also  show  that  the  announcement  effect  for  the  target  shareholders  is  significantly  larger  in 
diversifying bids than in intra-industry or focus-oriented bids. The opposite is observed for the bidding 
firm:  the  announcement  of  a  focus  strategy  generates  significantly  higher  abnormal  returns  than  the 
announcement of a diversification into an unrelated business segment. This evidence suggests that bidders 
tend  to  bid  more  aggressively  in  unrelated  acquisitions  and  hence  to  overpay  and  that  diversifying 
acquisitions are driven by motives other than shareholder profit maximization. Acquisitions of private 
target firms are associated with significant positive abnormal returns to the bidders (0.8% at day 0). In 
contrast, acquisitions of public companies trigger negative average abnormal returns to the bidders which 
are insignificantly different from zero. 
 
Finally, we demonstrate that takeovers occurring at a later stage of the takeover wave trigger lower gains 
to shareholders than M&As at the beginning of the wave. For both bidding and target firms, the lowest 6-
month CAARs are realized in M&As that occur at the end of the wave (2000-2001) and many M&A deals 
undertaken in the late 1990s destroyed bidders’ value. The result is similar to findings reported in recent 
empirical literature for US M&As (e.g. Moeller et al. 2005) and indicates that takeover waves tend to pass Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe 
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their optimal stopping point. Unprofitable takeovers at the later stages of the wave result from limited 
information processing, hubris, and managerial self-interest.  
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Appendix A. Cumulative abnormal returns for target firms by country of their incorporation 
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Appendix B. Cumulative abnormal returns for bidding firms by country of incorporation 
  ALL  AUS  BEL  DEN  FIN  FRA  GER  IRE  ITA  LUX  NL  NOR  POR  ESP  SWE  SWZ  UK  OTH
* 
CAAR % 
[-40, -1] 
0.88  3.53  1.15  -3.04  0.12  0.51  -2.72  6.33  4.59  14.49  4.17  4.44  12.92  4.21  2.56  2.32  0.37  -11.06 
trank  1.59  1.19  0.70  -1.57  1.12  -0.52  -1.29  2.18
b  2.39
b  2.06  1.05  1.75
c  0.52  1.30  1.99
b  0.93  0.96  -0.30 
tp  1.65
c  1.97
c  0.69  -1.22  1.45  -0.46  -1.21  2.62
b  2.44
b  1.77  1.09  2.10
b  1.16  2.30
b  2.59
a  1.28  1.34  -0.34 
tst  3.87
a  1.40  2.05
b  -1.76
c  1.17  -1.09  -0.70  4.38
a  3.27
a  1.79  1.63  1.78
c  0.36  -0.20  2.46
b  2.60
b  4.16
a  -3.00
a 
% Pos  50  43  57  42  49  45  44  67  67  100  57  61  50  63  54  56  49  40 
CAAR % 
[T=0] 
0.51  1.28  0.23  0.75  2.51  0.02  0.75  -0.14  0.70  1.70  -0.68  0.77  0.44  0.60  1.06  -0.11  0.37  1.07 
trank  4.79
a  1.23  0.80  2.23
b  2.78
a  0.07  2.52
b  -0.61  1.19  1.29  -1.07  1.14  0.29  1.42  1.91
c  -0.19  2.33
b  0.00 
tp  6.12
a  3.35
a  0.52  2.56
b  7.97
a  0.05  3.40
a  -0.32  1.96
c  1.19  -1.36  2.02
b  0.24  1.84  4.48
a  -0.36  4.10
a  0.30 
tst  12.55
a  1.82
c  0.55  2.98
a  8.93
a  1.15  5.47
a  -0.59  1.32  1.17  -0.86  2.37
b  -0.11  2.41  3.83
a  2.09
b  8.31
a  0.37 
% Pos  50  55  49  54  62  47  56  56  47  67  48  57  50  51  49  53  48  53 
CAAR % 
[-1, +1] 
0.74  0.96  1.11  0.90  3.78  0.60  0.73  3.16  1.38  -0.02  0.19  0.58  1.50  0.80  1.18  0.44  0.39  -1.78 
trank  4.51
a  0.83  1.31  1.58  2.60
b  1.41  1.80
c  1.58  2.13
b  -0.03  0.19  0.71  2.82  0.79  1.84
c  0.62  1.53  -0.32 
tp  5.16
a  1.45  1.45  1.77
c  6.93
a  0.97  1.92
c  4.26
a  2.24
b  -0.01  0.22  0.88  0.48  1.41  2.88
a  0.86  2.46
b  -0.14 
tst  15.04
a  0.12  1.27  2.69
a  8.27
a  3.47
a  2.97
a  3.00
a  2.37
b  -0.02  0.81  -0.33  0.52  1.50  2.74
a  2.60
b  6.49
a  -1.10 
% Pos  51  45  51  54  58  48  55  56  55  67  52  43  1.00  53  53  47  50  47 
CAAR % 
[-5, +5] 
0.74  4.83  3.03  0.10  2.16  0.42  0.13  5.58  0.55  9.55  2.22  1.40  -0.84  0.49  1.52  0.59  0.52  -4.91 
trank  2.84
a  2.14
b  1.97
c  0.12  1.34  0.45  0.20  1.74  0.52  3.60  1.14  1.17  -0.36  0.31  1.84
c  0.62  1.41  -0.82 
tp  2.67
a  3.82
a  2.06
b  0.10  2.07
b  0.36  0.18  3.92
a  0.47  2.01  1.34  1.11  -0.14  0.45  1.95
c  0.60  1.73
c  -0.57 
tst  6.74
a  2.77
a  2.63
b  -0.04  2.62
a  -1.40  1.63  3.55
a  0.58  2.10  2.14
b  0.82  -0.38  0.35  1.73
c  1.68
c  4.76
a  -1.30 
% Pos  51  58  62  46  54  54  51  67  45  100  48  49  50  55  57  47  49  38 
CAAR % 
[-60, +60] 
-2.94  3.96  2.80  -2.16  2.64  -8.27  -7.79  1.77  5.04  30.56  8.81  -1.23  22.23  10.13  -2.39  -5.83  -0.97  -18.64 
trank  -2.45
b  0.58  0.42  -0.64  0.46  -2.03
b  -2.29
b  0.29  1.14  1.14  1.01  -0.23  0.44  2.15
b  -0.62  -0.99  -0.55  -0.95 
tp  -3.21
a  0.94  0.57  -0.67  0.76  -2.10
b  -3.20
a  0.38  1.29  1.94  1.60  -0.29  1.12  2.82
a  -0.92  -1.78
c  -0.97  -1.68
c 
tst  2.42
b  0.31  2.05
b  -1.54  1.18  -2.64
a  -0.50  0.28  2.06
b  1.88  2.41
b  -0.65  0.15  2.85
a  0.32  -0.51  -4.15
a  -1.00 
% Pos  50  50  68  44  48  48  49  50  53  67  57  50  50  63  48  44  50  34 
No. of obs.  2194  40  47  50  84  305  243  36  49  3  21  76  2  49  157  55  917  60 
OTH
* = = Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech republic, ZR, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lituania, Romania, Slovakia 
a/b/c - statistical significance at 1%/5%/10%, respectively. Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe 
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Table 1. Intra-industry takeovers as a percentage of total number of cross-border and domestic 
European M&As  
 
This table shows the percentage of intra-industry M&As based on the total number of all European 
takeover announcements within each industry during 1993-2001. An acquisition is classified as an intra-
industry takeover if both bidding and target firms operate in the same industry (bidder’s and target’s 2-
digit SIC codes are the same). The sample is partitioned into domestic and cross-border acquisitions.   
 
   Cross-border bids, %  Domestic bids, % 
Media and Entertainment  79.4  78.9 
Consumer Staples  76.6  76.5 
High Technology  72.4  71.9 
Real Estate  72.4  75.0 
Industrials  70.6  68.2 
Materials  69.3  63.2 
Healthcare  67.7  70.2 
Retail  66.3  71.4 
Energy and Power  65.0  65.0 
Consumer Products and Services  62.0  62.5 
Telecommunications  48.0  41.3 
Financials  45.9  27.7 
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Table 2. Sample composition (number of bids). 
 
Table shows the number of all the takeover announcements in our sample and partitions this sample in 
several ways: (i) domestic and cross-border deals; (ii) acquisition of 100% control and acquisition of 
majority interest (iii) friendly M&As (excluding tender offers), unopposed tender offers, and hostile bids; 
(iv)  completed,  pending,  and  withdrawn  bids  (v)  private  and  public  target  firm  legal  status;  (vi) 
diversification and focus acquisition strategy (vii) and all-cash, all-equity, or mixed cash, equity, and 
debt payment structure in takeovers.   
 
  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  1993-
2001 
% 
                       
Total sample  171  229  228  229  229  292  411  408  222  2,419  100.0 
                       
Domestic bid  131  171  159  168  160  193  280  269  150  1,681  69.5 
Cross-border bid  40  58  69  61  69  99  131  139  72  738  30.5 
                       
Merger/acquisition 
of 100% 
95  124  138  144  138  110  153  170  88  1,451  60.0 
Acquisition of 
voting majority  
76  105  90  85  91  182  258  238  134  968  40.0 
                       
Hostile bid  13  13  23  12  17  18  32  27  7  162  6.7 
Friendly M&A  158  216  205  217  212  274  379  381  215  2,257  93.3 
    Of which: tender 
offers 
23  31  43  39  56  68  97  76  40  473  19.6 
                       
Completed bid  129  177  186  189  191  251  344  312  162  1,941  80.2 
Pending bid  21  27  19  27  11  20  37  68  41  271  11.2 
Withdrawn bid  21  25  23  13  27  21  30  28  19  207  8.6 
                       
Private target  118  160  143  167  142  181  224  256  139  1,530  63.2 
Listed target  53  69  85  62  87  111  187  152  83  889  36.8 
                       
Diversification  59  99  83  98  76  85  132  147  82  861  35.6 
Industry focus  112  130  145  131  153  207  279  261  140  1,558  64.4 
                       
All-cash bid  48  74  84  91  100  112  177  165  87  938  38.8 
All-equity bid  33  36  31  26  41  30  60  61  31  349  14.4 
Mixed bid  45  37  45  53  32  52  68  60  42  434  17.9 
Undisclosed 
payment 
45  82  68  59  56  98  106  122  62  698  28.9 
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Table 3. Average value of takeover transactions by year of bid announcement (US$ million)  
 
Table reports average value of takeover bids across different categories of our sample: (i) domestic and 
cross-border deals; (ii) acquisition of 100% control and acquisition of majority interest (iii) friendly 
M&As (excluding tender offers), unopposed tender offers, and hostile bids; (iv) private and public target 
firm legal status; (iv) completed, pending, and withdrawn bids (vi) diversification and focus acquisition 
strategy (vii) and all-cash, all-equity, or mixed cash, equity, and debt payment structure in takeovers.   
 
  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  1993-2001 
                     
Total sample  83.1  76.5  178.6  394.8  206.9  494.0  1,726.5  426.9  267.2  556.3 
                     
Domestic bids  73.5  68.6  196.9  436.2  158.9  271.3  855.9  311.4  166.3  336.7 
Cross-border bids  131.6  105.4  119.0  198.9  381.3  1,046.7  3,959.0  683.1  537.8  1,210.2 
                     
Acquisition of 100%  77.6  89.7  219.6  468.3  208.7  552.6  1,965.7  444.1  264.1  624.3 
Acquis. of major 
interest  97.0  45.1  45.7  103.3  201.1  302.4  1,002.2  376.7  275.6  350.4 
                     
Mergers and 
Acquisitions  33.1  24.7  21.5  389.9  161.3  310.8  625.4  166.7  218.6  250.2 
Tender offers  233.6  121.9  260.4  298.6  110.0  762.6  846.9  735.3  359.2  517.9 
Hostile bids  154.1  359.3  652.7  739.3  777.6  579.9  10,840.3  1,103.4  414.5  2,502.9 
                     
Private target  24.9  23.4  36.4  62.6  86.2  34.5  118.3  197.0  32.9  77.9 
Listed target  201.2  164.7  361.3  931.4  332.5  925.1  2,878.1  647.9  522.4  1,081.2 
                     
Diversification  70.7  25.5  190.9  605.4  100.1  819.3  200.8  254.7  106.9  270.5 
Industry focus  91.6  115.4  172.4  217.9  257.6  385.6  2,343.0  515.1  350.8  703.8 
                     
All-cash bids  61.8  87.9  86.1  200.8  256.3  196.9  340.1  293.5  249.6  227.7 
All-equity bids  157.3  130.1  120.4  1,753.1  242.2  2,352.9  2,881.5  919.2  36.3  1,136.0 
Mixed bids  70.6  17.1  365.2  159.6  35.1  110.2  4,251.6  374.8  409.8  850.8 
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Table 4. Sample composition by countries of bidding and target firms. 
 
Table shows the number of all the takeover announcements in our sample by country and partitions this 
sample in several ways: (i) by domestic and cross-border deals, (ii) by friendly M&As (excluding tender 
offers), unopposed tender offers, and hostile bids, (iii) and by target and by bidder country.   
 
    Domestic deals  Cross-border deals,  
Classification by bidder country 
Cross-border deals,  
Classification by target country 
   
All 
% by 
country 
Friendly 
M&A 
Tender 
Offer 
Hostile 
bid  All 
% by 
country 
Friendly 
M&A 
Tender 
Offer 
Hostile 
bid  All 
% by 
country 
Friendly 
M&A 
Tender 
Offer 
Hostile 
bid 
1  Austria  11  0.7%  11  0  0  31  4.2%  30  1  0  20  2.7%  16  1  3 
2  Belgium  23  1.4%  22  1  0  34  4.6%  28  5  1  14  1.9%  11  3  0 
3  Bulgaria  0  0.0%  0  0  0  0  0.0%  0  0  0  2  0.3%  2  0  0 
4  Croatia  0  0.0%  0  0  0  1  0.1%  1  0  0  6  0.8%  6  0  0 
5  Cyprus  3  0.2%  3  0  0  2  0.3%  1  1  0  0  0.0%  0  0  0 
6  Czech Rep.  9  0.5%  8  1  0  1  0.1%  1  0  0  25  3.4%  25  0  0 
7  Denmark  30  1.8%  21  3  6  32  4.3%  25  6  1  21  2.8%  16  4  1 
8  Estonia  0  0.0%  0  0  0  0  0.0%  0  0  0  13  1.8%  13  0  0 
9  Finland  53  3.2%  52  0  1  32  4.3%  29  2  1  20  2.7%  19  0  1 
10  France  219  13.0%  176  30  13  111  15.0%  92  10  9  89  12.0%  81  7  1 
11  Germany  175  10.4%  165  8  2  89  12.0%  71  14  4  94  12.7%  91  2  1 
13  Hungary  4  0.2%  4  0  0  5  0.7%  5  0  0  3  0.4%  3  0  0 
14  Ireland  11  0.7%  6  4  1  27  3.6%  18  7  2  16  2.2%  10  5  1 
15  Italy  39  2.3%  32  4  3  28  3.8%  24  3  1  44  5.9%  43  0  1 
16  Latvia  0  0.0%  0  0  0  1  0.1%  1  0  0  4  0.5%  4  0  0 
17  Lithuania  1  0.1%  1  0  0  0  0.0%  0  0  0  6  0.8%  5  1  0 
18  Luxemburg  0  0.0%  0  0  0  7  0.9%  6  1  0  5  0.7%  4  1  0 
19  Netherlands  2  0.1%  1  1  0  27  3.6%  16  10  1  45  6.1%  37  7  1 
20  Norway  58  3.5%  44  9  5  32  4.3%  29  1  2  37  5.0%  23  7  7 
21  Poland  22  1.3%  22  0  0  0  0.0%  0  0  0  37  5.0%  34  3  0 
22  Portugal  1  0.1%  1  0  0  1  0.1%  1  0  0  11  1.5%  10  1  0 
23  Romania  2  0.1%  2  0  0  0  0.0%  0  0  0  11  1.5%  11  0  0 
24  Russia  10  0.6%  10  0  0  3  0.4%  3  0  0  10  1.4%  9  1  0 
25  Slovenia  0  0.0%  0  0  0  0  0.0%  0  0  0  4  0.5%  2  2  0 
26  Spain  46  2.7%  33  6  7  9  1.2%  4  5  0  33  4.5%  30  3  0 
27  Sweden  102  6.1%  62  29  11  69  9.3%  59  7  3  48  6.5%  38  10  0 
28  Switzerland  22  1.3%  19  1  2  39  5.3%  26  10  3  28  3.8%  22  4  2 
29  UK  838  49.9%  485  274  79  159  21.5%  136  19  4  94  12.7%  41  40  13 
  Total  1681 100.0%  1180  371  130  740  100.0%  606  102  32  740  100.0%  606  102  32 Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe 
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Table 5. Cumulative average abnormal returns for target and bidding firms. 
 
Table reports average values of CAARs for bidding and target firms for 5 different event windows. T=0 stands 
for the day of the bid announcement. Abnormal returns are computed as the difference between realized and 
market model benchmark returns. For each firm we calculate daily benchmark returns using MSCI-Europe 
index returns and the market model parameters are estimated over 240 days starting 300 days prior to the 
acquisition announcement and ending 60 days prior to the announcement. Two parametric tests (Brown and 
Warner, 1985) and one non-parametric test (Corrado, 1989) are used to assess the significance of the CAARs. 
‘% Positive’ is a percentage of takeover announcements with a positive CAR in our sample. a/b/c - statistical 
significance at 1%/5%/10%, respectively. 
 
  Bidding firms    Target firms 
Event window  [-40, -1]  [T=0]  [-1, +1]  [-5, +5] [-60, +60]    [-40, -1]  [T=0]  [-1, +1]  [-5, +5] [-60, +60] 
                       
CAAR (%) 
Whole sample 
0.39  0.53  0.72  0.79  -2.83    11.49  9.13  12.47  15.83  26.70 
trank  0.76  4.90
a  4.28
a  3.19
a  -2.48
b    4.54
a  15.41
a  16.94
a  12.36
a  6.67
a 
tp  0.83  7.19
a  5.63
a  3.21
a  -3.18
a    3.28
a  9.97
a  7.53
a  6.10
a  12.44
a 
tst  1.27  12.33
a  14.37
a  6.26
a  1.96
b    28.93
a  150.01
a  115.05
a  78.68
a  62.57
a 
% Positive  48  50  50  51  50    69  70  78  79  76 
No. of obs.  2109            760         
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Figure 1. European takeover activity, total value of deals (in US$ trillion). 
 
Source: Thomson Financial Securities Data 
 
 
 
Figure 2. European takeover activity: the total number of deals. 
 
Source: Thomson Financial Securities Data 
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Figure 3. Cross-border acquisitions as a percentage of all intra-European deals. 
 
Source: Thomson Financial Securities Data 
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Figure 4. Total value of M&As during 1993-2001    Figure 5. Total number of M&As during 1993-2001 
by country of bidding and target firms (US$ million).          by country of bidding and target firms. 
 
 
Source: Thomson Financial Securities Data 
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Figure 6. Total number of cross-border M&As during 1993-2001 by primary industry.  
 
Source: Thomson Financial Securities Data 
 
 
Figure 7. Total value of cross-border M&As during 1993-2001 by primary industry.  
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Figure 8. Total number of domestic M&As during 1993-2001 by primary industry.  
 
Source: Thomson Financial Securities Data 
 
 
Figure 9. Proportion of divestitures in total M&A activity. 
 
Source: Thomson Financial Securities Data 
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Figure 10. Percentage of all-cash, all-equity, and mixed bids (based on total value of European 
M&A activity). 
 
Source: Thomson Financial Securities Data 
 
 
Figure 11. Percentage of all-cash, all-equity, and mixed bids (based on total number of European 
M&As). 
 
Source: Thomson Financial Securities Data 
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Figure 12. Percentage of all-cash and all-equity bids (based on total value of M&As). 
 
Source: Thomson Financial Securities Data and DataStream 
 
 
Figure 13. Average value of all-cash, all-equity, and mixed bids initiated by listed bidders. 
 
Source: Thomson Financial Securities Data and DataStream 
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Figure 14. The number of European hostile takeovers. 
 
Source: Thomson Financial Securities Data 
 
 
Figure 15. Target CAARs around the M&A announcement. 
 
This figure shows the market reaction to the announcement of M&A transactions for target firms as well 
as the CAARs before and after the event (day 0). The benchmark used in the market model is the MSCI-
Europe index returns; the model parameters are estimated over 240 days starting 300 days prior to the 
acquisition announcement.  
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Figure 16. Bidder CAARs around the M&A announcement. 
 
This figure shows the market reaction to the announcement of M&A transactions for bidding firms as well 
as the CAARs before and after the event (day 0). The benchmark used in the market model is the MSCI-
Europe index returns; the model parameters are estimated over 240 days starting 300 days prior to the 
acquisition announcement.  
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Figure 17. Target CAARs by bid attitude (friendly vs. hostile) and by form of the bid (tender offer 
vs. negotiated M&As). 
 
This figure shows the evolution of the market reaction to the announcement of M&A transactions for 
target firms by bid attitude and by form of the bid. The sample of hostile acquisitions includes deals in 
which the target firm’s board opposes the takeover and deals in which a competing bidder was present. 
The day of the bid announcement is day 0. Abnormal returns are computed as the difference between 
realized and market model benchmark returns. For each firm we calculate daily benchmark returns using 
MSCI-Europe index returns and market model parameters are estimated over 240 days starting 300 days 
prior to the acquisition announcement. 
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Figure 18. Bidder CAARs by bid attitude (friendly vs. hostile) and by form of the bid (tender offer 
vs. negotiated M&As). 
 
This figure shows the evolution of the market reaction to the announcement of M&A transactions for 
bidding firms by bid attitude and by form of the bid. The sample of hostile acquisitions includes deals in 
which the target firm’s board opposes the takeover and deals in which a competing bidder was present. 
The day of the bid announcement is day 0. Abnormal returns are computed as the difference between 
realized and market model benchmark returns. For each firm we calculate daily benchmark returns using 
MSCI-Europe index returns and market model parameters are estimated over 240 days starting 300 days 
prior to the acquisition announcement. 
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Figure 19. Target CAARs by means of payment. 
 
This figure shows the market reaction to the announcement of M&A transactions for target firms by 
means of payment employed in the transaction: all-cash, all-equity, and mixed cash, equity, or offers of 
which the payment was not disclosed (and remains unknown to date). The day of the announcement is day 
0. Abnormal returns are computed as the difference between the realized and market model benchmark 
returns. For each firm we calculate the daily benchmark returns using MSCI-Europe index returns and 
the market model parameters are estimated over 240 days starting 300 days prior to the acquisition 
announcement. 
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Figure 20. Bidder CAARs by means of payment. 
 
This figure shows the market reaction to the announcement of M&A transactions for bidder firms by 
means of payment employed in the transaction: all-cash, all-equity, and mixed cash, equity, or offers of 
which the payment was not disclosed (and remains unknown to date). The day of the announcement is day 
0. Abnormal returns are computed as the difference between the realized and market model benchmark 
returns. For each firm we calculate daily benchmark returns using MSCI-Europe index returns and the 
market  model  parameters  are  estimated  over  240  days  starting  300  days  prior  to  the  acquisition 
announcement. 
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Figure 21. Target CAARs in domestic and cross border bids. 
 
This  figure  shows  the  market  reaction  to  the  announcement  of  domestic  and  cross-border  M&A 
transactions for target firms. The day of the bid announcement is day 0. Abnormal returns are computed 
as the difference between the realized and market model benchmark returns. For each firm we calculate 
daily  benchmark  returns  using  MSCI-Europe  index  returns  and  the  market  model  parameters  are 
estimated over 240 days starting 300 days prior to the acquisition announcement. 
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Figure 22. Bidder CAARs in domestic and cross border bids. 
 
This  figure  shows  the  market  reaction  to  the  announcement  of  domestic  and  cross-border  M&A 
transactions for bidding firms. The day of the bid announcement is day 0. Abnormal returns are computed 
as the difference between the realized and market model benchmark returns. For each firm we calculate 
daily benchmark returns using MSCI-Europe index returns and the market model parameters estimated 
over 240 days starting 300 days prior to the acquisition announcement. 
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Figure 23. Target CAARs, UK vs. Continental European targets. 
 
The  figure  shows  the  market  reaction  to  the  announcement  of  domestic  and  cross-border  M&A 
transactions for UK and Continental European target firms. The day of the bid announcement is day 0. 
Abnormal returns are computed as the difference between the realized and market model benchmark 
returns. For each firm we calculate daily benchmark returns using MSCI-Europe index returns and the 
market  model  parameters  are  estimated  over  240  days  starting  300  days  prior  to  the  acquisition 
announcement. 
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Figure 24. Bidder CAARs, UK vs. Cont. European target. 
 
The  figure  shows  the  market  reaction  to  the  announcement  of  domestic  and  cross-border  M&A 
transactions for UK and Continental European bidding firms. The day of the bid announcement is day 0. 
Abnormal returns are computed as the difference between the realized and market model benchmark 
returns. For each firm we calculate daily benchmark returns using MSCI-Europe index returns and the 
market  model  parameters  are  estimated  over  240  days  starting  300  days  prior  to  the  acquisition 
announcement. 
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Figure 25. Target CAARs in domestic bids by legal origin. 
 
This figure shows the market reaction to the announcement of domestic M&A transactions for target 
firms by legal origin. Countries are grouped according to their legal origin following the classification by 
LaPorta et al. (1998) and according to the EU enlargement process. Countries are grouped as follows: 
English  legal  origin  (Republic  of  Ireland  and  the  UK),  German  legal  origin  (Austria,  Germany, 
Switzerland),  French  legal  origin  (Belgium,  France,  Greece,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain), Scandinavian legal origin (Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden,), 2004 EU 
Accession  (Czech  Republic,  Cyprus,  Estonia,  Hungary,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Poland,  Slovak  Republic, 
Slovenia),  2007-2009  likely  EU  Accession  (Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Romania).  The  day  of  the  bid 
announcement is  day  0. Abnormal returns are computed  as  the  difference  between  the  realized  and 
market model benchmark returns. For each firm we calculate the daily benchmark returns using MSCI-
Europe index returns and the market model parameters are estimated over 240 days starting 300 days 
prior to the acquisition announcement. 
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Figure 26. Bidder CAARs in domestic acquisitions by legal origin. 
 
This figure shows the market reaction to the announcement of domestic M&A transactions for bidding 
firms by legal origin. Countries are grouped according to their legal origin following the classification by 
La Porta et al. (1998) and according to the EU enlargement process. Countries are grouped as follows: 
English  legal  origin  (Republic  of  Ireland  and  the  UK),  German  legal  origin  (Austria,  Germany, 
Switzerland),  French  legal  origin  (Belgium,  France,  Greece,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain), Scandinavian legal origin (Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden,), 2004 EU 
Accession  (Czech  Republic,  Cyprus,  Estonia,  Hungary,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Poland,  Slovak  Republic, 
Slovenia),  2007-2009  likely  EU  Accession  (Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Romania).  The  day  of  the  bid 
announcement is  day  0. Abnormal returns are computed  as  the  difference  between  the  realized  and 
market model benchmark returns. For each firm we calculate the daily benchmark returns using MSCI-
Europe index returns and the market model parameters are estimated over 240 days starting 300 days 
prior to the acquisition announcement. 
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Figure 27. Target CAARs in cross-border bids by target legal origin. 
 
This figure shows the market reaction to the announcement of cross-border M&A transactions for target 
firms by legal origin. Countries are grouped according to their legal origin following the classification by 
La Porta et al. (1998) and according to the EU enlargement process. Countries are grouped as follows: 
English  legal  origin  (Republic  of  Ireland  and  the  UK),  German  legal  origin  (Austria,  Germany, 
Switzerland),  French  legal  origin  (Belgium,  France,  Greece,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain), Scandinavian legal origin (Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden,), 2004 EU 
Accession  (Czech  Republic,  Cyprus,  Estonia,  Hungary,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Poland,  Slovak  Republic, 
Slovenia),  2007-2009  likely  EU  Accession  (Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Romania).  The  day  of  the  bid 
announcement is  day  0. Abnormal returns are computed  as  the  difference  between  the  realized  and 
market model benchmark returns. For each firm we calculate the daily benchmark returns using MSCI-
Europe index returns and the market model parameters are estimated over 240 days starting 300 days 
prior to the acquisition announcement. 
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Figure 28. Bidder CAARs in cross-border bids by target legal origin. 
 
This  figure  shows  the  market  reaction  to  the  announcement  of  cross-border  M&A  transactions  for 
bidding  firms  by  legal  origin.  Countries  are  grouped  according  to  their  legal  origin  following  the 
classification by La Porta et al. (1998) and according to the EU enlargement process. Countries are 
grouped as follows: English legal origin (Republic of Ireland and the UK), German legal origin (Austria, 
Germany,  Switzerland),  French  legal  origin  (Belgium,  France,  Greece,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain), Scandinavian legal origin (Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden,), 
2004  EU  Accession  (Czech  Republic,  Cyprus,  Estonia,  Hungary,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Poland,  Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia), 2007-2009 likely EU Accession (Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania). The day of the bid 
announcement is  day  0. Abnormal returns are computed  as  the  difference  between  the  realized  and 
market model benchmark returns. For each firm we calculate the daily benchmark returns using MSCI-
Europe index returns and the market model parameters are estimated over 240 days starting 300 days 
prior to the acquisition announcement. 
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Figure 29. Target CAARs in cross-border bids by bidder legal origin. 
 
This figure shows the market reaction to the announcement of cross-border M&A transactions for target 
firms  by  bidder  legal  origin.  Countries  are  grouped  according  to  their  legal  origin  following  the 
classification by La Porta et al. (1998) and according to the EU enlargement process. Countries are 
grouped as follows: English legal origin (Republic of Ireland and the UK), German legal origin (Austria, 
Germany,  Switzerland),  French  legal  origin  (Belgium,  France,  Greece,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain), Scandinavian legal origin (Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden,), 
2004  EU  Accession  (Czech  Republic,  Cyprus,  Estonia,  Hungary,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Poland,  Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia), 2007-2009 likely EU Accession (Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania). The day of the bid 
announcement is  day  0. Abnormal returns are computed  as  the  difference  between  the  realized  and 
market model benchmark returns. For each firm we calculate the daily benchmark returns using MSCI-
Europe index returns and the market model parameters are estimated over 240 days starting 300 days 
prior to the acquisition announcement. 
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Figure 30. Bidder CAARs in cross-border acquisitions by bidder legal origin. 
 
This  figure  shows  the  market  reaction  to  the  announcement  of  cross-border  M&A  transactions  for 
bidding  firms  by  legal  origin.  Countries  are  grouped  according  to  their  legal  origin  following  the 
classification by La Porta et al. (1998) and according to the EU enlargement process. Countries are 
grouped as follows: English legal origin (Republic of Ireland and the UK), German legal origin (Austria, 
Germany,  Switzerland),  French  legal  origin  (Belgium,  France,  Greece,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain), Scandinavian legal origin (Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden,), 
2004  EU  Accession  (Czech  Republic,  Cyprus,  Estonia,  Hungary,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Poland,  Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia), 2007-2009 likely EU Accession (Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania). The day of the bid 
announcement is  day  0. Abnormal returns are computed  as  the  difference  between  the  realized  and 
market model benchmark returns. For each firm we calculate the daily benchmark returns using MSCI-
Europe index returns and the market model parameters are estimated over 240 days starting 300 days 
prior to the acquisition announcement. 
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Figure 31. Target CAARs by bid completion status. 
 
The figure shows the market reaction to the announcement of M&A transactions for target firms by bid 
completion  status. A  takeover is  considered  to  be completed  if  the  bidder  has  successfully  acquired 
control over the target company; it is withdrawn if the bidder failed to acquire control over company; 
and pending if the acquisition of control has been announced but has not been completed or withdrawn 
afterwards. The day of the bid announcement is day 0. Abnormal returns are computed as the difference 
between the realized and market model benchmark returns. For each firm we calculate daily benchmark 
returns using MSCI-Europe index returns and the market model parameters are estimated over 240 days 
starting 300 days prior to the acquisition announcement. 
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Figure 32. Bidder CAARs by bid completion status. 
 
The figure shows the market reaction to the announcement of M&A transactions for bidding firms by bid 
completion  status. A  takeover is  considered  to  be completed  if  the  bidder  has  successfully  acquired 
control over the target company; it is withdrawn if the bidder failed to acquire control over company; 
and pending if the acquisition of control has been announced but has not been completed or withdrawn 
afterwards. The day of the bid announcement is day 0. Abnormal returns are computed as the difference 
between the realized and market model benchmark returns. For each firm we calculate daily benchmark 
returns using MSCI-Europe index returns and the market model parameters are estimated over 240 days 
starting 300 days prior to the acquisition announcement. 
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Figure 33. Target CAARs by corporate strategy, focus vs. diversification. 
 
This figure shows the market reaction to the announcement of M&A transactions for target firms by 
takeover strategy (focus versus diversification). A takeover strategy is considered to be focus-oriented if 
the 2-digit SIC codes of the bidding and target firms coincide, and to be diversification-oriented if this is 
not the case. The day of the bid announcement is day 0. Abnormal returns are computed as the difference 
between  the  realized  and  market  model  benchmark  returns.  For  each  firm  we  calculate  the  daily 
benchmark returns using MSCI-Europe index returns and the market model parameters are estimated 
over 240 days starting 300 days prior to the acquisition announcement. 
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Figure 34. Bidder CAARs by corporate strategy, focus vs. diversification. 
 
This figure shows the market reaction to the announcement of M&A transactions for bidding firms by 
takeover strategy (focus versus diversification). A takeover strategy is considered to be focus-oriented if 
the 2-digit SIC codes of the bidding and target firms coincide, and to be diversification-oriented if this is 
not the case. The day of the bid announcement is day 0. Abnormal returns are computed as the difference 
between  the  realized  and  market  model  benchmark  returns.  For  each  firm  we  calculate  the  daily 
benchmark returns using MSCI-Europe index returns and the market model parameters are estimated 
over 240 days starting 300 days prior to the acquisition announcement. 
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Figure 35. Bidder CAARs by target legal status (private vs. public). 
 
The figure shows the market reaction to the announcement of M&A transactions for bidding firms by 
legal status of target firms (public vs. private). A target firm is considered to be private if it is a stand-
alone firm not listed on any stock exchange. The day of the bid announcement is day 0. Abnormal returns 
are computed as the difference between realized and market model benchmark returns. For each firm we 
calculate  the  daily  benchmark  returns  using  MSCI-Europe  index  returns  and  the  market  model 
parameters are estimated over 240 days starting 300 days prior to the acquisition announcement. 
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Figure 36. Target CAARs by the form of takeover. 
 
The figure shows the market reaction to the announcement of M&A transactions for target firms by form 
of takeover (a merger or acquisition of 100% of the equity versus and acquisition of a majority stake). An 
acquisition of a majority stake occurs if the total shareholding of the bidder after the deal completion is 
less than 100%. The day of the bid announcement is day 0. Abnormal returns are computed as the 
difference between the realized and market model benchmark returns. For each firm we calculate the 
daily  benchmark  returns  using  MSCI-Europe  index  returns  and  the  market  model  parameters  are 
estimated over 240 days starting 300 days prior to the acquisition announcement. 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
-60 -55 -50 -45 -40 -35 -30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Merger or Acquisition of 100%
Acquisition of Majority interestMergers and Acquisitions in Europe 
  75
Figure 37. Bidder CAARs by the form of takeover. 
 
The figure shows the market reaction to the announcement of M&A transactions for bidding firms by 
form of takeover (a merger or acquisition of 100% of the equity versus and acquisition of a majority 
stake). An acquisition of a majority stake occurs if the total shareholding of the bidder after the deal 
completion is less than 100%. The day of the bid announcement is day 0. Abnormal returns are computed 
as the difference between the realized and market model benchmark returns. For each firm we calculate 
the daily benchmark returns using MSCI-Europe index returns and the market model parameters are 
estimated over 240 days starting 300 days prior to the acquisition announcement. 
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Figure 38. Target CAARs by sub-periods of the 5th takeover wave.   
 
This figure shows the market reaction to the announcement of M&A transactions for target firms by sub-
periods of the fifth takeover wave: bids announced in the beginning of the wave (1993-1996), at the peak 
of the wave (1997-1999), and subsequent to the peak (2000-2001). The day of the bid announcement is 
day  0.  Abnormal  returns  are  computed  as  the  difference  between  the  realized  and  market  model 
benchmark returns. For each firm we calculate the daily benchmark returns using MSCI-Europe index 
returns and the market model parameters are estimated over 240 days starting 300 days prior to the 
acquisition announcement. 
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Figure 39. Bidder CAARs by sub-periods of the 5th takeover wave.   
 
This figure shows the market reaction to the announcement of M&A transactions for bidding firms by 
sub-periods of the fifth takeover wave: bids announced in the beginning of the wave (1993-1996), at the 
peak of the wave (1997-1999), and subsequent to the peak (2000-2001). The day of the bid announcement 
is  day  0.  Abnormal  returns  are  computed  as  the  difference  between  the  realized  and  market  model 
benchmark returns. For each firm we calculate the daily benchmark returns using MSCI-Europe index 
returns and the market model parameters are estimated over 240 days starting 300 days prior to the 
acquisition announcement. 
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